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INTRODUCTION

History repeats itself in the law as iii other arenas. In the law of executive
compensation, such a repetition may be imminent. Ever since the advent of the large
industrial corporation in the United States, there has been periodic outrage at
payments made to its top executives. This repetition suggests that the law has failed
to keep pace with the observed problems.
Although the dissonance between the law and public perception of executive
compensation has grown again in the 1990s as it has periodically since the 1930s,
probably never since then has the public's perception so clearly been that chief executives lounge in luxury while the average worker searches in vain for employment.
The sentiment is universal: "Anyone can tell you what the problem is. Just ask your
neighbor or cabdriver-then stand back."l As one recent congressional witness put
it, "[n]ever have so few done so little to get so much from so many."2
Modern co~porate law has developed an exceedingly deferential response to
challenges to executive compensation. Though courts have long claimed the equitable power to trim executive pay packages,3 such power is rarely used. Rather,
courts focus on the process used by the corporation's board of directors in setting
the pay level; if it is sufficiently sterilized of improper influence, that will be the end
of the matter, never mind the tens of millions paid to one person for one year's
ordinary work.· By giving minute attention to the processes of the board, courts
have missed the larger more fundamental question. "[T]he courts find the question
Is this executive being paid too much? more designed to produce a neurosis than an
answer."5 Most calls for reform of the compensation-setting methods adopt this
judicial focus by suggesting only that the negotiating position of the board be
strengthened. 6 Clearly, the existing legal rules are unresponsive to current trends of
both shareholder and general popular outrage about the unchecked growth of executive paychecks. No court or commentator has developed a legal rule that focuses. on
the propriety of the executive's conduct in accepting such extraordinary amounts of
compensa tion.
But surprisingly, the law has a ready answer to the fundamental question: the
corporate officer owes duties of care and loyalty to the corporation, independent of
those same but more familiar duties owed by each director.' This is a longstanding
l. Geoffrey Colvin, How to Pay the CEO Righi, FORTUNE, Apr. 6, 1992, at 61.
2. The SEC and the Issue of Runaway Executive Pay: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of Government Management of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
10 (1991) [hereinafter Runaway Executive Pay) (testimony of Nell Minow, President, Institutional
Shareholder Services, Inc.).
3. See, e.g., Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582 (1933); Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653, 679 (Sup.
Ct.), affd, 32 N.Y.S.2d 131 (App. Div. 1941).
4. See generally ROBERT C. CLARK. CORPORATE LAW 193-94 (1986). For a detailed discussion
and critique of current legal standards, see infra part III.
5. Robert B. Mautz & Gerald W. Rock, The Wages of Management, II FLA. L. REV. 474, 506
( 1958).
6. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
7. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.42 (1991); PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(a) gen. cmt. a (Am. Law Inst. Proposed Official Draft 1992)
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though mostly overlooked principle of corporation law. s Thus, the proper result in
some cases may be that a corporate officer should have a duty not to accept unreasonable compensation, even though the board of directors might not itself be liable
for approving the compensation. Imposing such a duty would repair a significant
failure of modern corporation law by imposing the duty to monitor executive
compensation upon those who have the power and information to do so--the corporate executives themselves. This approach will succeed when process-oriented
reforms would fail because it overcomes the inherent limitations on the ability of the
corporation to negotiate with its chief executive and analyzes the conduct and duties
of that chief executive directly. Moreover, imposing such a duty on chief executives
will not expose them to overwhelming litigation or liability; rather, it will force the
executives, the directors, and the courts to focus on the merits rather than simply
the process of executive compensation.
Part I of this Article describes the current and historic uproar over executive
compensation in large corporations in the United States. Part II provides the
economic background of the process of negotiating executive compensation. Part III
analyzes the existing reaction of courts to executive compensation challenges. Part
IV collects the sparse history of the corporate officer's separate duties and sketches
what those might include if defined by courts today in executive compensation cases.
Finally, Part V demonstrates how these duties respond more efficiently to the
economic, political, and legal issues involved than current rules.
I.

THE CYCLICAL OUTRAGE OVER EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION

The modern corporate executive is a product of industrial expansion and the
concentration of corporate control of the late 1800s and the early 1900s. 9 Since at
least the 1930s, there has been debate about every decade or so over the amount of
money and other benefits received by these executives. 1o

[hereinafter PRI:--iCIPLES OF CORPORATE GovER:-;ANCEj. The Model Act provision has been adopted in 21
states. See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
8. "The precise nature of the duties and liabilities of corporate officers who are not directors is a
topic that has received little attention from courts and commentators." A. Gilchrist Sparks, "' &
Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Common Law Duties of Non-Director Corporate Officers, 48 Bus. LAW. 215,
215 (1992).
9. See I GEORGE T. WASHINGTO:-; & V. HENRY ROTHSCHILD II. COMPE:-;SATING THE CORPORATE EXECt.:TlVE 5-6 (3d ed. 1962).
10. As to the current examination of executive compensation, see infra part I.A. For the prior
periodic discussions of the issue, see Detlev Vagts, Challenges 10 Executive Compensation: For the
Markets or for the Courts?, 8 J. CORP. L. 231 (1983); RALPH NADER ET AL., TAMING THE GIANT
CORPORATION 115-18 (1976); WILBERT E. MOORE. THE CONDUCT Of THE CORPORATION 10·15 (1962);
JA. UVI:-';GSTON. THE AMERICAN STOCKHOLDER 222·30 (1958); Mautz & Rock, supra note 5; ROBERT
A. GORDON. BUSINESS LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE CORPORATION 273·77 (1945). Gordon, in turn, was
the "leading academic student" of the fundamental principles in this area, espoused in ADOLf A. BERLE.
JR. & GARDINER c. MEANS. THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). See George
J. Stigler & Claire Friedland. The Literature of Economics: The Case of Berle and Means. 26 J.L. &
Eco:-.:. 237, 245 (1983).
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A.

The Current Controversy

Executive compensation most recently captured the nation's attention last year
when, in the midst of declining corporate profits, executives continued to receive

"spectacular pay increases."" When twelve chief executives of major U.S. corpora-

tions accompanied President Bush to Japan early in 1992, complaints about their
compensation surfaced in advance of the trip, 2 and the ensuing publicity equalled
13
or surpassed that given to the planned negotiation of trade agreements. The next

month, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) staff announced, in letters
to ten corporations, that it would not acquiesce in those firms' decisions to exclude
shareholder proposals on executive pay from the upcoming proxy statements and
annual meetings."' Within a matter of weeks Fortune magazine announced that
"The issue of [executive] pay has finally landed on the national agenda and won't
be leaving soon." 5 The Wall Street Journal shortly thereafter proclaimed 1992
"the year of the pay protest."' 6 Politicians from all parties decried high executive
pay during the presidential election campaign,"7 and shareholder groups and institutional shareholders have become active, targeting particular overpaid executives."8
Congressional interest in the subject was apparent in two hearings dedicated 'to the
issue "9' and in legislation designed to allow stockholders to vote on proposals

11. Runaway Executive Pay, supra note 2, at I (statement of Sen. Levin).
12. See Jill Abramson & Christopher J. Chipello, High Pay of CEOs Traveling With Bush
Touches a Nerve in Asia, WALL ST. J.. Dec. 30, 1991, at Al.
13. Kevin G. Salwen, Shareholders Likely to Get Vote on Pay, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 1992, at A3
("President Bush's ill-fated trip to Japan was notable as much for the pay levels of the executives he
brought with him as for the trade pacts he reached.").
14. Kevin G. Salwen, Shareholder Proposals On Pay Must Be Aired, SEC to Tell 10 Firms,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 1992, at Al. These measures have now been put to the shareholders, and while
none were passed, several received the affirmative votes of 10 to 15%, with one receiving almost 37%.
See Executive Compensation Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 6940, 57 Fed. Reg. 29,582, 29,583
n.8 (June 23, 1992).
15. Colvin, supra note 1, at 61.
16. Amanda Bennett, A Little Pain and a Lot to Gain, WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 1992, at RI.
17. See Abramson & Chipello, supra note 12, at A3 (noting remarks of New York Governor
Mario Cuomo, then Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton, and Vice President Quayle); Bennett, supra note
16, at R2 ("From the start, presidential candidates Bill Clinton, Bob Kerrey and Paul Tsongas regularly
inveighed against excessive CEO pay."); Colvin, supra note 1, at 61 ("When a conservative like [Vice
President] Quayle rails against 'those exorbitant salaries paid to corporate executives unrelated to
productivity,' something's up."). A few weeks before his election, President Clinton proposed limiting the
federal income tax deduction for compensation to $1 million per executive and permitting shareholders to
determine the compensation of top executives. Kevin G. Salwen, Clinton Backs Executive Pay Set by
Holders WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 1992, at Cl.
18.

See

UNITED

SHAREHOLDERS

Ass'N. EXECUTIVE

COMPENSATION

IN

CORPORATE

AMERICA

(1991). United Shareholders Association prepared in 1991 a "Target 50" list of companies it considers
unfair to shareholders, and large institutional investors, such as the California Public Employees' Retirement System, and some mutual fund managers are directly questioning corporations about executive pay.
Kevin G. Salwen & Joann S. Lublin, Giant Investors Flex Their Muscles More at U.S. Corporations,
WALL ST J., Apr. 27, 1992, at Al.
19. See Runaway Executive Pay, supra note 2; Stealth Compensation of Corporate Executives:
Federal Treatment of Stock Options: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of Government
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regarding executive compensation and to modify the disclosure and accounting
procedures in this area. 20 Later in 1992, the SEC adopted sweeping changes in the

in the disclosure required in
proxy system" along with significant modifications
2
proxy statements about executive compensation.1
The resulting pressure has spurred several corporations to voluntarily limit
executive compensation. 21 Ironically, the initial response by corporations to the furor
over executive pay has apparently served only to fan the flames. Many corporations
have restructured executive pay packages to reduce salaries and bonuses but have,
at the same time, increased the executives' stock options and similar incentives.24
Stock options and other long-term compensation now overwhelm many executives'
recent salary cuts.2 5 Some compensation consultants characterize the changes as

Management of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) [hereinafter
Stealth Compensation).
20. See S. 1198, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991), 137 CONG. REC. S6997-99 (daily ed. June 4, 1991)
(text of bill and introductory remarks of Sen. Levin, the bill's sponsor). See also 138 CONG. REC. S21415 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1992) (subsequent remarks of Sen. Levin on the Senate floor promoting S. 1198).
21. See Regulation of Communications Among Securityholders, Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 31.326, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,276 (June 24, 1992).
22. See Executive Compensation Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 6962, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,126
(Oct. 21, 1992). The significant new elements in the disclosure system include a single summary table
showing both annual and long-term compensation for senior executives, a required report of the corporation's compensation committee on corporate performance factors it considered in setting the CEO's
compensation, and a graph showing the cumulative five-year return to shareholders compared with
market and industry norms. See id. at 48,126-27. Though the SEC undertook a significant cost-benefit
analysis in proposing and revising the new rules, see id. at 48,143-44, some commentators have questioned the need for this enormous amount of additional information. For a particularly irreverent review,
see Marianne M. Jennings, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Shareholders' Meeting, Bus.
LAw TODAY, Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 42.
23. "Over the past eight months, United Shareholders has reached and publicized agreements with
14 of the 50 companies in its 1991 target list. Other companies are calling the gadfly outfit to find out
" Salwen & Lublin, supra note 18, at Al. In addition, "Inlew
how they can keep off its 1992 list ....
executive capitulations are reported almost weekly." Id. One observer has suggested that pressure from
institutional investors and shareholder groups is the best approach to resolving compensation issues. See
Linda J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to Controlling Executive Pay,
68 IND. L.J. 59, 96-99 (1992).
24. Amanda Bennett, Big Firms Rely More On Options but Fail to End Pay Criticism, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 11, 1992, at Al.
25. See Bennett, supra note 16, at RI-R2. The Journal's computation of long-term compensation,
which includes gains from exercise of stock options, stock appreciation rights, the value of restricted stock
whose restrictions have lapsed, and dividend equivalents shows some interesting results in conirast to
some executives' salary reductions. For example, the Journal reports that Chrysler's Lee lacocca, while
cutting his 1991 salary and bonus 36% to just under $1 million, received that same year $1.9 million in
long-term compensation; Paramount's Marvin Davis took a 25% salary and bonus cut to $2.75 million
but received $2.3 million in long-term compensation; Apple Computer's John Sculley took a 39% pay cut
to $1.3 million but received long-term compensation, albeit over several years, valued at $14.5 million;
and ITT's Rand Araskog, one of the executives who negotiated a restructuring in response to shareholder
group pressure, see Salwen & Lublin, supra note 18, at Al, took a 27% salary cut to $2.8 million but
received over $1 million in long-term compensation. The Boss's Pay, WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 1992, at R9RI I. The SEC's proposed rules on executive compensation have also taken note of this trend, observing
that 'these changes have accelerated, with long-term incentive compensation overtaking the more tradi-
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actions of corporate boards of directors concerned more with appearance-or
"shareholder optics"-than substance. 6

Many critics maintain that stock options and similar devices are not as daring a
move for executives as they might at first appear, because they lack "downside"
risk; if the company's stock price declines, the executive's option merely becomes
valueless while the shareholders sustain actual investment losses.17 In addition,
disclosure problems abound, because the actual value of long-term incentive packages may be difficult to determine, and because most of these incentive methods
require little or no charge to earnings under current accounting practices.2 8 In
response, proposals exist for reform of accounting and disclosure treatment of longterm incentive compensation, 29 and compensation experts are seeking to devise other
methods to better correlate the executive's pay with the company's performance.3
B.

A Historical Perspective

With the exception of this current focus on incentive compensation, very little
has changed in the executive pay debates over the years. Professor Vagts began his
article on the subject ten years ago with a recitation of the business and political
background that would apply with equal force to the current controversy." And

tional fixed salary and bonus to become the largest single component of the total mix of the typical
executive pay package," resulting in disclosures under current rules "that many shareholders find incomprehensible." Executive Compensation Disclosure, supra note 14, at 29,584.
26. Bennett, supra note 16, at R2.
27. See, e.g., Stealth Compensation, supra note 19, at 2 (remarks of Sen. Levin); GRAEF S.
CRYSTAl. IN SEARCH OF EXCESS: THE OVERCOMPENSATION OF AMERICAN EXECUTIVES 175-76 (1991);
Ira'T. Kay, Beyond Stock Options: Emerging Practices in Executive Incentive Programs, COMPENSATION & BENEFITS REV., Nov.-Dec. 1991, at 19; Bennett, supra note 24, at A5.
Even so, if the stock price declines, companies frequently "reprice" the options at a lower exercise
price, so that in effect the option-holding executive can make money on the repriced options while the
corresponding shareholder is still showing a loss. See CRYSTAL, supra note 27, at 174-76; Colvin, supra
note 1, at 62-63. The recent SEC rules require specific disclosure of any such option repricing. See
Executive Compensation Disclosure, supra note 22, at 48,142.
One commentator has suggested that stock option plans often have insufficient "upside" reward as
well. Because the value of the option is tied to the stock price, a well-functioning market will already
have anticipated the superior performance of a superior chief executive before the options are issued, thus
under-rewarding that performance. See Stephen F. O'Byrne, Shareholder Return and Management
Performance, COMPENSATION & BENEFITS REV., Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 30.
28. See Amanda Bennett, Counting on Options, WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 1992, at R2; Stealth
Compensation, supra note 19, at 2 (remarks of Sen. Levin) and 111-16 (testimony of Walter P.
Schuetze, Chief Accountant, SEC); CRYSTAL, supra note 27, at 230-40.
29. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing proposed legislation). The recent SEC
rules have not addressed accounting standards, noting current studies underway by the SEC accounting
staff and the Financial Accounting Standards Board. Executive Compensation Disclosure, supra note 14,
at 29,587 n.27.
30. See, e.g., Kay, supra note 27, at 23-27 (discussing bonuses for retaining shares from exercised
options, "premium" options priced above the current market price, and bonuses tied to "strategic mileposts" such as achievements in research and development or employee productivity).
31. Professor Vagts' introductory remarks (except for the tellingly dated references to dollar
amounts and stock index levels) could have been written today:

1992]
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J.A. Livingston almost 35 years ago correctly predicted "a Congressional investigation of executive remuneration" 2 which "could make unpleasant headlines." 3
Executive compensation has at least three characteristics that have served over
the past few decades to make it an enduring lightning rod for shareholder and
public criticism. First, the absolute amounts earned by the top executives of the
nation's largest corporations are and consistently have been enormous. 3' Although
there certainly is no one correct figure, since the reported averages differ with the
year measured, levels of measurement, and sample size, reported amounts are now
consistently above $1 million per year, with amounts of $100 million becoming
common.3 5 Second, the amount of compensation varies in extreme amounts among
even the largest corporations; the highest-paid chief executive in these samples may
have up to 1,000 times the compensation of the lowest-paid chief executive. 3 6

Tremors here and there indicate that a new wave of concern about the generosity of
management compensation may be on the way. From the courts one observes a string of
cases attacking compensation practices, particularly stock options and other stock plans.
The Securities and Exchange Commission has stirred up the waters with endeavors to
extract a more meaningful type of disclosure from the managements of publicly held corporations. . . .Even some business writers have arched eyebrows over the recent surge in
management compensation that has carried the best paid executives to well over the one
million dollar line, which seemed for years-like the stock market's Dow Jones "one thousand"--to serve as a psychological barrier to advances.
Vagts, supra note 10, at 232 (footnotes omitted).
32. LIVINGSTON, supra note 10, at 229. He noted in an update that shortly after this prediction
Senator Kefauver inquired about high executive salaries in the steel industry, id. at 230, but the recent
interest of a different Senate Committee has been even more pervasive. See Stealth Compensation, supra
note 19;Runaway Executive Pay, supra note 2.
33. LIVINGSTON, supra note 10, at 230. For an example of such headlines, see Abramson &
Chipello, supra note 12.
34.
Others have used less kind adjectives. Business Week, hardly the voice of the masses, is
using words like "mind-numbing," "huge floods of cash," "obscene," and "out of control"
to describe current levels of compensation. The figures look like phone numbers. Never, at
any time in the history of this country, has there been such a disparity between the pay of
the person at the top of the company and the person at the bottom.
Runaway Executive Pay, supra note 2, at 72 (testimony of Nell Minnow, President, Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc.).
35. See The Boss's Pay, supra note 25, at R9 (calculating a 1991 median for 121 chief executives
of $1.3 million); Colvin, supra note I, at 61 (calculating a 1991 average for 282 chief executives of $1.7
million, and for the 30 largest, an average of $3.2 million); UNITED SHAREHOLDERS ASS'N, supra note 18,
at 7 (calculating a 1990 adjusted averages for top and bottom halves of 1000 chief executives of $2
million and $950,000 respectively); Runaway Executive Pay, supra note 2, at 5 (testimony of Prof. Graef
S. Crystal) (calculating a current average for 200 chief executives of $4 million). This has been a consistent complaint historically. See, e.g., NADER ET AL., supra note 10, at 117; MOORE, supra note 10, at 1015.
36. UNITED SHAREHOLDERS Ass'N, supra note 18, at 10-28, ranks 1990 compensation of chief
executives of 918 companies from a low of $100,000 to a high of $99.6 million, or 996 to one. A survey of
232 chief executives' 1990 compensation by Adrienne Linsenmeyer-Hardman & Leland Montgomery,
Rolling with the Risk Takers, FIN. WORLD, May 26, 1992, at 30, 43-44, lists the top figure at $117
million and the bottom figure at $250,000, for a differential of 468 to one, though the authors caution
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Finally, and perhaps most disconcerting, the compensation of the chief executive has
little if any correlation to performance on the job, by any conventional measure."
Not even the new emphasis on "pay for performance" in restructuring executive pay
packages seems to link pay and performance. s8
Why does all this arouse the public's outrage? It is not the financial impact; no
one has suggested that lavish spending on executive compensation is a severe or even
material drain on the earnings of these corporations."9 Rather, it is the effect on
morals and morale, magnified by the current political and economic climate, that is
the problem.4
against comparisons across industries, id. at 30. The difference between the highest ($75 million) and
lowest ($270,000) reported total compensation in The Boss's Pay, supra note 25, is 277 to one. This too
is a characteristic long noted by scholars. See Mautz & Rock, supra note 5, at 478 (concluding, even in
1958 that "[tlhis extreme range of salaries is a constant occurrence"); Frank"D. Emerson & Minnette
Massey, Remuneration of Officers and Directors of Listed California, Florida, Ohio and Virginia Corporations, 12 FLA. L REV. 156, 188 (1959) (confirming the conclusions of a 1950 study that variations in
compensation are "many and erratic") (citing MABEL NEWCOMER. THE BIG BUSINEss EXECUTIVE
(1955)).
37. See UNITED SHAREHOLDERS Ass'N, supra note 18, at 4 (noting that about 30% of the difference in pay is accounted for by company size, and only 4% by chief executive performance, which
"leaves about 66% of the differences in CEO pay not explainable by the two things that ought to explain
virtually all of the differences"); NADER ET AL., supra note 10, at 115; Mautz & Rock, supra note 5, at
480 (concluding upon review of various types of pay schemes that "[e]xcept within the broadest ranges,
compensation appears not to be related in any discernible manner to . . . the amount of money required
to motivate economic man").
38. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
39. In 1990, chief executive salaries of 800 corporations amounted to less than 1% of profits. See
Barris, supra note 23, at 67. Nader, Green, and Seligman note that "if excessive remuneration were...
confined to the corporate chief executive, it would seem small once it was divided by the total number of
shares in most large industrial corporations." NADER ET AL., supra note 10, at 117. However, they argue
further that, because the chief executive sets the compensation of his immediate subordinates at exorbitant levels as well, the excessive compensation may become "truly expensive." Id. See also Vagts, supra
note 10, at 274 (noting that the effect may be significant in smaller corporations, but that "[iln large
corporations, the identifiable harm to any one person is small. A very sizeable overpayment comes to
pennies per shareholder").
40. See Vagts, supra note 10, at 274 (noting that, despite immaterial financial impact, "(tihe law
pursues these crimes, in part, simply because they are violations of the moral system"). Consider, for
example, the following summary of the peculiar alchemy that created the current furor.
Maybe if the economy were thriving and big employers were hiring, no one would care.
Maybe if President Bush hadn't taken the auto company CEOs to Japan to meet their
lower-paid, more successful competitors, or if consumer confidence weren't in the tank, or
if giant companies weren't still announcing vast layoffs, CEO pay wouldn't be on the front
pages. But all those things have happened, making Americans deeply, bitterly mad and
creating an issue no politician can resist.
Colvin, supra note I, at 61. And even in the context of a profitable merger, the impact of executive
compensation goes beyond its immediate financial magnitude.
We recognize that the amount of benefits provided . . . to the executives is not overwhelming in proportion to the net worth of the [corporations] and the multi-billion dollar
values involved in the merger. Nevertheless, the use of corporate funds for purposes which
are not in the best interests of the shareholders cannot be excused simply because the
opportunity for such occurs in the course of . . . an overall financial gain for the
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The morale of the employees and even the stockholders is likely to be dampened when the chief executive's pay is over 100 times that of the average worker in
the corporation. 4 This is especially true if that chief executive has not been doing
well by any measure of performance.4 Indeed, this disparity of compensation along
with poor industry performance is the combination that has always tended to
produce popular outrage over executive pay. 3 Professor Alfred Conard observed

stockholders.
Gaillard v. Natomas Co., 256 Cal. Rptr. 702, 716 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
41. See Runaway Executive Pay, supra note 2, at 5 (testimony of Prof. Graef S. Crystal) (citing
1987-89 median pay of chief executives at 100 times that of average workers). Other estimates by
Crystal have gone as high as 160 times; furthermore, "[olther compensation specialists confirm Mr.
Crystal's estimates, give or take a few points." Abramson & Chipello, supra note 12, at Al. In addition,
the growth of executive pay far outstripped that of other workers; in the 1980s, executive pay increased
four times faster than factory workers' wages. See Barris, supra note 23, at 60-61 (noting a 212%
increase for executive compensation and a 53% increase for factory workers' wages during the 1980s).
42. See Barris, supra note 23, at 70 ("There is more at stake here than just bad feelings. American
competitiveness is also suffering, due in part to employee discontent. . . . Employees won't follow executives they cannot trust, and they cannot trust executives who see to it that they are overpaid."); James R.
Repetui, Corporate Governance and Stockholder Abdication: Missing Factors in Tax Policy Analysis, 67
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 971, 978 (1992) (explaining that inflated executiye salaries "lead to low worker
morale" and encourage management strategies "that maximize sales and growth . . . at the expense of
long-term profitability"). See also ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW. POWER AND ACCOUNTABtLITY

170 (1991), reprinted in Runaway Executive Pay, supra note 2, at 83 ("Imagine the feelings of the
General Motors workers when, after massive layoffs of middle managers and operatives in 1987, the
company proposed to pay executives large cash bonuses. . . .The impact on shareholder morale can also
be devastating."). Ms. Minow gives another example in her testimony.
United Airlines Chairman Steve Wolf collected $18.3 million in salary, bonus, and stockbased incentive plans: a tidy sum for heading up a company whose profits fell by 71
percent in 1990. That is 1,200 times what a new flight attendant earned at United Airlines
in each of the last 5 years, a period when none of them got a raise. If you were a flight
attendant, what would your incentive be to do better for the company, to keep that
company competitive?
Runaway Executive Pay, supra note 2, at 10 (testimony of Nell Minow, President, Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc.).
43. The first cases attacking executive compensation appeared in the early years of the Great
Depression. Once the new federal securities laws forced disclosure of compensation paid not only before,
but after the stock market crash, shareholder and popular outrage surfaced.
While some decline took place in the absolute
purchasing power of the amounts paid was still
tive class as a whole probably suffered less
meantime, working men were being discharged
and dividends were not being paid.

amounts paid to corporate executives, the
high and during the depression the executhan the rest of the population. In the
in large numbers, wage levels were falling,

I WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD, supra note 9, at 7. The same could be said of the popular perception
today.
[N]ot only have the pay packages of American CEOs and other senior executives risen to
unprecedented heights, but they also have become more and more risk-free. In contrast, the
pay of American workers, adjusted for inflation and taxes, has gone nowhere during the
last two decades or so. And if you want to know something about risk, all you need to do is
interview a few of the thousands of American autoworkers who are now standing in length-

The Journal of Corporation Law

[Summer

several years ago the "disease" of "Abuse of Control" by corporate executives,

noting that such abuse "undermine[s] the faith of workers that their productivity
contributes proportionately to their own rewards and destroy[s] the perception of
commonality in objectives and benefits that gives dignity to work.""
Beyond the impact on the corporation's constituencies, social morals are
offended by such corporate largesse. It is simply wrong for chief executives to accept
more compensation for their services than they are worth. 5 Such rules should have
a central place in the law, 6 but they are absent from the law of executive compensation. Lawyers and lawmakers need to be concerned when the models-the legal
rules--do not compare favorably with the public perception of what the rules ought

to be. "'
These perceived harms to morals and morale remain despite occasional proof
that the problem may not be as bad as it seems. Economists gathering on the fiftieth
anniversary of the publication of The Modern Corporation and Private Property,'8
while critical of the data included in the book 9 and calling its reception "astonishingly uncritical," 50 noted that its ideas and conclusions have endured to an extent
not empirically justified. One commentator suggested this is because moral and
policy issues retain significance even when they may be economically insignificant,
noting that the enduring popularity of the book and its theme is "a testament to our
ening unemployment lines.
Runaway Executive Pay, supra note 2, at 57 (statement of Professor Graef S. Crystal). Professor Vagts,
writing ten years ago, noted that current concerns about executive compensation differ from their depression-era counterparts, see Vagts, supra note 10, at 255, but recited problems that are amazingly similar
to the ones mentioned in the 1930s, as well as in the 1990s.
Changes in the economy may have an impact on the national mood as to lavish compensation. . . . The most publicly visible contrast is in the automobile industry, where pay has
been substantially higher for the major U.S. firms than their foreign counterparts even
while competitive success has eluded us. Excessive executive compensation may be more
objectionable in an atmosphere in which a concentration on expanding the economic pie is
shifting towards concern about how it is to be divided.
Id. at 232.
44. Alfred F. Conard, Theses for a Corporate Reformation, 19 U.C. DAVis L. REV. 259, 266
(1986).
45. "In this [excessive executive compensation], it seems to me, social morals are infringed. The
very men who benefit from this system can damage it, perhaps destroy it through greed." LiVINGsTON,
supra note 10, at 229.
46. See infra part V.B.2.
47. Professor Eisenberg, in writing about the "myth" that directors "manage" the modern corporation, observed that "[blecause it is inherently undesirable for law and practice to be in a state of visible
opposition, the drastic skew between the legal and working models . . . would be of serious concern even
if no specific dysfunctional consequences could be perceived." Melvin A. Eisenberg, Legal Models of
Management Structure in the Modern Corporation: Officers, Directors, Accountants, 63 CAL. L. REV.
375, 383 (1975).
48. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 10.
49. See, e.g., Stigler & Friedland, supra note 10, at 248-58, who, using methods and data available
to Berle and Means, found no correlation between private or public ownership of firms and executive
compensation or profitability.
50. Id. at 258.
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uneasy, deep-down feeling that we economists have been missing something imporconviction in
tant in failing to explore systematically the role of evolving ideological
'
the changing structure of the economy of the past century. 51
Excessive executive compensation creates an appearance of impropriety beyond
its economic significance that reaches internationally as well. Even before President
Bush and the chief executives accompanying him were criticized during their travels
to Japan to discuss trade barriers, the Japanese made it clear that they viewed the
high pay of United States corporate executives as a key non-tariff barrier to those
corporations' ability to compete in a world market. 5
These are the peculiar characteristics of executive compensation. Every few
years, but especially during periods of economic recession, the topic appears to take
on sufficient political appeal to bring it to the national headlines. If indeed it is a
problem, why has it not been solved, or different solutions at least attempted? How
and why do the levels of pay remain so out of line with popular expectations of the
value of that executive's performance? These are the subjects of Parts II and III.
Part II describes the economic models and theories of market inefficiency that allow
high executive compensation to be paid in the first place. Part III describes the
development of legal doctrines that hinder significant challenge to such payments.

II.

THE ECONOMICS OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION

Economic theory suggests at least three partial causes of high executive pay.
These causes are discussed in detail because they bear on the propriety and workability of any solutions to the problem involving a change in legal rules. First,
economic theory suggests that agents, such as the executive officers of a corporation,
will seek and obtain larger compensation in large corporations because the owners
are dispersed and less able to control that compensation. Second, there are significant imperfections in the "market" for chief executives of large corporations,
making the traditional discipline of supply and demand particularly ineffective in
this instance. Finally, organizational theory of large corporations compounds these
effects by increasing the remuneration at the top and divorcing it from any measure
of performance.
A.

Costs of Non-Owner Managers

Berle and Means were the first to recognize the potential for the interests of

51. Douglass C. North, Comment on Stigler and Friedland, 26 JL. & EcoN. 269, 271 (1983).
52. See Barris, supra note 23, at 68-69 (noting that existing chief executive incentive pay programs
create perverse incentives on the part of the recipients to focus only on short-term gains and to be more
risk-averse in their entrepreneurial decisions); Abramson & Chipello, supra note 12, at Al (reporting
that in talks in May, 1991, "[tlhe Japanese argued that overpaid American executives were preoccupied
with short-term results, worsening U.S. international competitiveness"); Runaway Executive Pay, supra
note 2, at 17-18 (testimony of Robert A.G. Monks, President, Institutional Shareholder Partners, Inc.,
quoting a Treasury Department staff member: " 'And while we have told the Japanese they have to have
more bathrooms and they have to have better highways and better infrastructure, they have told us we
have got to have lower executive pay.' ").
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corporate management to diverge substantially from the interests of the shareholders.58 As soon as the owner-manager of a firm obtains a co-owner, the manager
will no longer bear the entire cost of perquisites consumed, and thus will increase
consumption of those items.' In other words, a manager has an incentive to either
perform less well on the job, or to demand more compensation for the same
performance if there are other non-manager owners. In the modern corporation,
where ownership is so widely dispersed that there is no effective control by the
owners, either management has the unrestrained ability to divert corporate
resources to personal use, or some mechanism exists to limit that ability.
Economists have postulated several mechanisms that exist to limit a non-owner
manager's ability to feast at the firm's expense. First, the process of negotiating an
executive's compensation will require the executive to pay next year for this year's
"shirking," a process known as "ex-post settling up."5 5 This process of settling up
has limitations, especially if the negotiations are one-sided in favor of management, 56 as they tend to be.5 1 Second, shirking managers might encourage outsiders
to consolidate control through a takeover or leveraged buyout."8 But it is uncertain
the degree to which levels of executive compensation influences bidders in the
market for corporate control. 59 Finally, some economists simply postulate that
assumed pressures toward equilibrium will limit the amount of chief executive
53. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 10, at 119-25, considered to be the beginning of "'modern
literature" on the subject. Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL.
ECON. 288, 288 n.1 (1980).
54. Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. &
EcON. 301, 305 (1983); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 317 (1976).
55. See Fama, supra note 53, at 296.
56. Fama recognizes that several assumptions are necessary for this negotiating process to eliminate agency costs, the most telling of which is that "ft]he weight of the wage revision process is sufficient
to resolve any potential problems with managerial incentives." Id. at 297.
57. For a discussion of management's domination of the compensation-setting process, see infra
part lI.B.
58. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management
in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1168-74 (1981) (noting that other methods of
monitoring agency costs are not likely to work well "unless the management team as a whole is subject to
supervision and, if necessary, discharge," which is possible only with a hostile tender offer). Jensen &
Meckling, supra note 54, presaged the leveraged buy-outs of the late 1980s ten years before by recognizing them as a solution to these costs.
In general if the agency costs engendered by the existence of outside owners are positive it
will pay the absentee owner (i.e., shareholders) to sell out to an owner-manager who can
avoid these costs. This could be accomplished in principle by having the manager become
the sole equity holder by repurchasing all of the outside equity claims with funds obtained
through the issuance of limited liability debt claims and the use of his own personal wealth.
Id. at 333-34.
59. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 58, at 1173, suggest that outside bidders would be motivated by the potential overall reduction in agency costs throughout the firm. A high executive salary
alone does not necessarily mean that agency costs are high. The executive might perform work near the
value of his salary, or the agency costs may be limited to the chief executive and may not be material in
the overall performance of the company and its stock.
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shirking that shareholders will tolerate.6"
To the extent that these monitoring devices or pressures toward a competitive
equilibrium are inhibited due to market imperfections, significant "agency costs"
may exist. One such cost, of course, is excessive management compensation.
B.

Imperfections in the Market for Chief Executives

The second explanation that economics provides for such high executive
compensation is that, independent of agency costs, there is nothing approaching a
competitive market for chief executives where supply and demand can exert their
traditional moderating pressures. While this in part explains the existence of some
agency costs as discussed above,"1 it is an independent factor contributing to the
high cost of executive compensation.
There is, of course, a superficial "market" for chief executives of public companies. Their compensation is usually set annually by the board of directors or a
committee that looks at least casually outside the company to discern other executives' compensation. We can observe the market functioning at least in a mechanical
sense: buyers and sellers meet and make bargains. In theory, we might expect the
company, as purchaser of the CEO's services, to be sensitive to the amount paid,
aware of the prices of competitive services, and ever ready to recruit willing competitors from other companies if the incumbent's pay is too high or performance too
poor.
None of these expectations are realistic, however. The directors do not stand
ever ready to replace the chief executive; that is reserved for times of crisis, and is
certainly not routinely considered on an annual basis.6" And, it is unlikely that there
are several "candidates" from whom to choose, because executives are not highly
mobile nor motivated exclusively by compensation in choosing a job.63
Independent of this restricted supply is the fact that in this market the same
person-the executive-sits on both sides of the bargaining table. The nominal
buyer, the corporation, usually makes its purchase through the compensation
committee of the board of directors, which traditionally consists of independent
(non-management) directors.64 The compensation committee, in turn, relies on
compensation information generated by the corporation itself or by an outside

60. See Jensen & Meckling, supro note 54, at 350; Fama, supra note 53, at 297 (noting that some
assumptions underlying economic models "amount[U to assuming the desired result"); Harold Demsetz,
The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm, 26 J.L. & ECON. 375, at 390 (1983) ("How
could it be otherwise? In a world in which self-interest plays a significant role in economic behavior, it is
foolish to believe that owners of valuable resources [stockholders] systematically relinquish control to
managers who are not guided to serve their interests.").
61. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
62. See infra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
63. See Vagts, supra note 10, at 236-38 (reviewing the economics of the labor market and
concluding that "[liabor transactions . . .are more idiosyncratic than those on the securities markets,
and one is left with a conviction that the discipline of the labor market is at best a loose one").

64. See

CRYSTAL,

supra note 27, at 214.
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consultant retained by the corporation.6 5 In reality, however, the internal information, and even the conclusions of the consultant are under control of the chief
executive. 6 Recognizing this fact, most calls for reform of the executive compensaindependent counsel or consultants be retained by
tion-setting process suggest that
7
the compensation committee.1
Even if the independent compensation committee were given relevant information, it is not capable of earnest negotiation with the chief executive. Substantial
anecdotal evidence from participants in the process indicates that it is the chief
executive who controls the choice of all directors, whether "independent" or not.68
The culture of a corporate board or committee is not designed to support debate and
contention, but rather to build or ratify consensus. This is true of boards generally, 9
and of compensation committees in particular."0 And the types of "independent"
directors chosen are often chief executives at other companies, who are especially

65. Using this information will tend to impress reviewing courts that the compensation committee
has done its job. See Vagts, supra note 10, at 270.
66. CRYSTAL, supra note 27, at 215-20; Peter Passell, Those Big Executive Salaries May Mask a
Bigger Problem, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1992, at Al, C5 ("[Directors] rarely have the information or
incentive to pick the best executives in the first place. In short, . . . concluded [Professor Jeremy Stein of
the Sloan School of Management], 'there is no market' for chief executives.").

67. See
TOTAL

CRYSTAL,

PAY PERSPECTIVE

supra note 27, at 243-44; BRUCE R. ELLIG, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION-A
287 (1982); Conard, supra note 44, at 288; Vagts, supra note 10, at 275;

Committee on Corporate Laws, Am. Bar Ass'n Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, The
Overview Committees of the Board of Directors, 35 Bus. LAW. 1335, 1348 (1980); PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 7, § 3A.05 cmt. d. The Council of Institutional Investors, a trade
group for pension funds, recently proposed that the corporation's choice of compensation consultant be
approved each year by the shareholders. Gilbert Fuchsberg, Investors May Seek Vote on Executive Pay
Consultants, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 1992, at BI. Barris, supra note 23, at 78, remains skeptical about the
ability of reforms of the makeup of or information given to the compensation committee to make any
difference, concluding that any such reform "must be backed up with further incentives, provided either
by the threat of shareholder activism or by judicial action before any significant permanent changes will
be realized." Id.
68. See CRYSTAL, supra note 27, at 226-27; MOORE, supra note 10, at 15; Mautz & Rock, supra
note 5, at 488-500; GORDON, supra note 10, at 277 ("[O]nly in a restricted sense can a market for
executive ability be said to exist at all. Buyers and sellers are not independent. The chief executive is in a
sense his own employer. Within broad limits he frequently sets his own compensation.").
69. See James D. Cox & Harvey L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 83,
91-99; Note, The Propriety of Judicial Deference to Corporate Boards of Directors, 96 HARV L. REV.
1894, 1896-1902 (1983).
70.. See Barris, supra note 23, at 76 ("The composition of these [compensation] committees
negates any pretense of their impartiality or ability, while the corporate environment in which these
teams operate provides a playground for groupthink."); see also CRYSTAL, supra note 27, at 227 ("[lin
. . . boardrooms, it is considered well-nigh traitorous to buck the CEO. If things get bad enough, you
can fire the CEO. But until you do, you'd better support him."); Runaway Executive Pay, supra note 2,
at 18 (testimony of Robert A.G. Monks, President, Institutional Shareholder Partners, Inc.) ("If you get
on a board, in my view you are supposed to be a fiduciary. But if you are a fiduciary on a board and...
what the chief executive officer is paid is a matter of distress to you, you had best decline to serve."). A
recent study of 79 compensation committee chairs indicates that they believe that the chief executive is
still "in the driver's seat" with respect to the committee's work. William E. Lissey, Currents in Compen-

sation and Benefits,

COMPENSATION

&

BENEFITS REV-,

May-June 1991, at 5.
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likely to support higher compensation for their colleagues. 7 This combination of
pressure toward consensus, and the presence on the compensation committee of
those predisposed to higher pay for the chief executive makes earnest negotiation of
72
that pay impossible.
Thus, because we observe negotiation over compensation each year and some
occasional movement into and out of executive suites, it is tempting to conclude that
there appears to be a market for chief executives. However, closer examination
shows that this market has a limited number of sellers, and is filled with uninformed
buyers incapable of earnest negotiation with those few sellers. These major imperfections prevent the market from efficiently matching articulated demand with
available supply.7"
C. Absence of a Pay-PerformanceRelation
The aspect of the executive pay controversy that probably generates the most
public outrage is the lack of any coordination of pay with performance. It strains
the patience of the average American worker, investor, and voter to see large layoffs
and poor (or negative) earnings coupled with lavish pay increases in the executive
suite.

71.

Professor Repetti, discussing federal income tax policy and corporate governance, noted:
Since 63 percent of all outside directors on the boards of America's 1,000 largest companies are chief executives of other firms, the abdication of the board of directors should be
expected. Chief executives who serve as directors for companies other than their own are
generous in establishing the salaries of management of those companies because the high
salaries can then be used to justify large salaries from their own companies.

Repetti, supra note 42, at 977. See also J. Spencer Letts, Corporate Governance. A Different Slant, 35
Bus. LAW 1505, 1515 (1980). The most frequent choice for a disinterested director is a chief executive
at another company. Id. "One wonders, however, if the person among all who is most likely to be generally supportive of the chief executive isn't another chief executive." Id.
Professor Crystal found in empirical studies that "a potent predictor of how much a CEO will earn
turns out to be the average pay of the CEOs who sit on the Compensation Committee of that CEO's
Board." In addition, there was "a strong association between the extent to which outside directors are
paid over the market and the extent to which the CEO is paid over the market." Runaway Executive
Pay. supra note 2, at 58 (statement of Professor Graef S. Crystal, citing a study with Professors Charles
O'Reilly of the University of California-Berkeley and Brian Main of the University of Edinburgh).
72. Similar conclusions result from theoretical and empirical studies of wages paid to "rank and
file" workers. Much of the wage variation remains unexplained by supply-and-demand market forces,
firm size, or the presence of collective bargaining. Firms remain willing to pay premiums above the
market rate (the rate determined by the worker's productive value) as a method of managing a worker's
behavior on the job. In addition, workers tend to use as major reference points, not the price for their
services elsewhere, but what their coworkers in the same firm receive, and they have a built-in expectation that this amount will continue to rise over time independent of and in addition to any fluctuation in
price levels. See generally JAMES E. ANNABLE, JR., THE PRICE OF INDUSTRIAL LABOR 29, 136-40 (1984).

Although these theories are not directly applied by Annable to executive compensation, similarities are
apparent in the authorities cited supra notes 68-71, which discuss executive compensation specifically.
73. This market inefficiency may partially explain the wide variation in CEO salaries even in large
publicly-held corporations. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. Of course, there are variations in
the duties and responsibilities among these CEOs, but no study has examined whether these variations
justify up to a thousand-fold variation in compensation.
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Extensive empirical evidence exists linking executive compensation and the
performance of a company's stock.74 Although this might seem at first to be compelling proof of a link between pay and performance, it is illusory for several reasons.
Proof that executives with higher pay are found at companies with above average
growth as measured by stock price or firm size75 does not establish a causal link
between the two. Such evidence is equally consistent with a hypothesis that boards
of directors and their compensation committees at prosperous and growing firms
have no evidence or incentive to justify a cut in the executive's pay, and thus it
continues its rise unabated. 6 To extend the above empirical evidence to suggest a
link between pay and performance requires proof of some causal link between executive compensation and executive effort, and between executive effort and firm
prosperity. Though the studies do correct firm performance as measured by stock
price for general market performance, they cannot correct on a market-wide basis
for other individual explanatory factors unique to the company, such as development
of a new product, demise of a competitor, or surging consumer demand that may
have given the firm good results and growth quite apart from any initiatives from
the executive suite. 77 Anecdotal evidence suggests that traditional stock options do
not change an executive's motivation significantly,78 yet those options likely increase
total compensation. 79 Although empirical studies also have shown some correlation

74. One economist who surveyed 73 companies over 18 years concluded that "firm performance, as
measured by the shareholder's realized return, is strongly and positively related to managerial compensation. This result . . . comes as no surprise to economists but may shock editors of many popular business
" Kevin J. Murphy, Corporate Performance and Managerial Remuneration, 7 J. ACCT.
periodicals ....
& EcON. II, 40 (1985). Other economists reach similar conclusions when including the executive's gain
or loss on stock owned by that executive. See George J. Benston, The Self-Serving Management Hypothesis: Some Evidence, 7 J. ACCT. & ECON. 67, 81 (1985) (concluding that even with a small percentage of
shares owned by the executives studied, "the amounts they owned yielded annual gains and losses that
swamped their remuneration"); Demsetz, supra note 60, at 388-89.
75. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 74.
76. The tendency of executive salaries to rise, all other things being equal, has been shown above.
The executive has significant incentive to seek increases in salary each year, see supra part IIL.A, and the
corporation is for the most part unwilling and unable to refuse the executive's demands, see supra part
III.B. Indeed, boards of directors and compensation committees often contribute to the trend of pay
increases by adopting "premium pricing" as a matter of p5olicy, declaring that their top executives should
be paid at "above-average" rates. No company aims for below-average compensation for its executives.
Thus, upward pressure is virtually built-in. CRYSTAL, supra note 27, at 222-23. Nearly identical attributes have been observed in the. nonexecutive labor market. See ANNABLE, supra note 72, at 136-37.
77. See Barris, supra note 23, at 66 (stating that "a compensation plan aimed at motivation may
in fact reward an executive for lucky circumstance or crafty tactics instead of individual effort").
78. The absence of "downside" risk, see supra text accompanying note 27, is one critical factor.
See also Kay, supra note 27, at 19 (noting that traditional stock options do not link executive and
shareholder interests); Bennett, supra note 16, at RI-R2 (concluding that, although options have been
included in executive pay packages, total compensation is certain to continue increasing); Bennett, supra
note 24, at A4 (" 'I can't sit here and say if I didn't have this [stock-option] program, then my decisionmaking process would be less good than it is now,' (International Multifoods Corp. Chairman Anthony]
Luiso says. Adds Paul Quinn, a group vice president who also swapped cash for International Multifoods
stock: 'Would I behave any differently if I didn't have stock options? I don't think so.' "). Compensation
experts continue to struggle to relate pay to performance. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
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between poor stock price performance and executive turnover,80 this does not mean
that performance figures significantly into compensation determinations. Rather,
this evidence reinforces the traditional view of the role of the board of directors: to
replace the chief executive if necessary, but to support him or her in all other
cases. 8 ' Despite the statistical correlation between executive pay and stock performance, 82 other empirical research has shown the single most significant predictor of
the size of an executive's compensation not to be performance, but rather the size of
the employing corporation.8" Thus, the empirical link between pay and performance
is not one suggesting that better pay yields better performance by the company, but
rather the other way around: firms prosperous for whatever reason have no motivation to counteract the forces naturally pushing upward on executive compensation,
and thus better performance by the firm (for whatever reason) yields better pay for
the executive.
Organizational theory also provides several reasons why pay becomes divorced
from performance in large corporations. Effective motivation requires a "significant
salary differential" between different steps in the organizational hierarchy.84 The
more levels in that hierarchy, the larger the top level compensation must be. And
the closer the position to the top level, the larger those differences are.85 In addition,
the sheer size of these corporations generates institutional inertia. The rise through
the pay scales of the corporation, for the fortunate few to the rarified level of the
chief executive's pay, is simply a result of longevity in many instances.8 8

80. See Michael S. Weisbach, Outside Directors and CEO Turnover, 20 J.FIN. ECON. 431, 458-59
(1988) (finding that poor performance measures are more highly correlated with turnover in firms whose
boards are dominated by outside directors); Jerold B. Warner et al., Stock Prices and Top Management
Changes, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 461, 487-88 (1988) (finding a significant relationship, but noting that even in
the firms with the worst stock price performance, the probability of a chief executive's forced departure
in any year was approximately 6%, with lags of up to two years between the poor performance and the
executive's departure).
81. See supra note 70.
82. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
83. See UNITED SHAREHOLDERS ASS'N, supra note 18, at 4; 1 WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD, supra
note 9, at 21.
84. 1 WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD, supra note 9, at 25; MOORE, supra note 10, at 14-15
(suggesting that the addition of income tax effects might make a top-bottom differential of up to 100:1
appropriate).
85. Runaway Executive Pay, supra note 2, at 15 (testimony of Ralph V. Whitworth, President,
United Shareholders Ass'n, Inc.) (citing a study reporting a 57% difference between chief executive's
pay and the next-highest-ranking executive's pay); ELLIG, supra note 67, at 2 (noting that although
"public pressure on visible compensation for the five or so highest-paid executives serves to retard growth
[of compensation] in the upper portion of the [management] structure," "the absolute increases are probably still greater at the upper portion than the lower end"). See also I WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD,
supra note 9, at 22 & n.72. Recent international comparisons indicate that it is only the top executive's
pay that is significantly larger than peers in other countries; middle managers of United States companies receive compensation comparable to their overseas counterparts. See Amanda Bennett, Managers'
Incomes Aren't Worlds Apart, WALL ST. J.,Oct. 12, 1992, at BI.
86. See Runaway Executive Pay, supra note 2, at 15 (testimony of Ralph V. Whitworth, President, United Shareholders Ass'n, Inc.) (citing a survey concluding that "75 percent of CEO's come from
right within the company"); Passel, supra note 66, at C5 (citing research on ten companies that
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Summary

An observer might be tempted to conclude that a functioning market exists for
the CEOs of large United States corporations; after all, the executives bargain with
nominally independent representatives of the company each year for their jobs.
However, those executives have every incentive to seek more compensation
constantly, and the nominally independent representatives of the company have
built-in predispositions in favor of the executive. Compensation is not linked with
firm performance despite evidence that the two coexist more often than not; rather,
this suggests only that prosperous firms are by their prosperity able to maintain this
trend.

III.

THE LAW OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION

Courts review executive compensation arrangements in derivative actions by
disgruntled shareholders against the corporation's board of directors. 7 Deciding
how much to pay a corporation's executives is the responsibility of the board of
directors.88 The pay of all but the senior executives of the corporation is ordinarily
set by other officers, thus the board's judgment is usually involved only in the case
of the chief executive officer and a few subordinates. Shareholder challenges are
universally limited to the compensation of top executives; no suits have challenged
the corporate-wide pay scales. Thus, when plaintiffs challenge executive compensation in court, they are in every case challenging a decision made by the board of
directors or delegated to a committee of the board. In most large corporations, this
decision is delegated by the board to a compensation committee.89
This section summarizes and analyzes executive compensation decisions in the
context of existing judicial doctrines governing review of directors' actions. This is
difficult at times because existing doctrines and analyses often lack rational analysis.
For example, the exact relationship between the directors' duty of care and the business judgment rule has never been successfully explained in any generally
acceptable fashion.90 Nor have the exact relationships between the duty of care, the
improved overall performance, noting they had "something in common distinguishing the winners from
corporations that tried and failed to change: All 10 brought in outsiders-managers who had not spent a
career immersed in the corporate culture that they were pledged to change."); NADER ET AL., supra note
10, at 118 ("[T)he administrators of large industrial corporations ... at minimal personal risk, serve as
the bureaucrats of private industry. These individuals receive their staggeringly large salaries and stock
options by rising through executive ranks ....

"); I WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD. supra note 9, at 28.

Similar pressures exist on nonexecutive wages in large firms. See ANNABLE, supra note 72, at 139-41.
87. Occasionally the issue is raised in other settings, such as a defense in an action by the officer to
recover salary due, see, e.g., Flight Equip. & Eng'g Corp. v. Shelton, 103 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 1958), or a
suit by shareholders to dissolve the corporation, see, e.g., Gianotti v. Hamway, 387 S.E.2d 725 (Va.
1990).
88.

See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT, supra note 7, § 8.01(b), which vests all corporate powers in

the board of directors. This language or similar language appears in the statutes of every state. See 2
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. 786-87 (1992).
89.

See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.

90. The drafters of the Model Business Corporation Act, after considerable effort, declined to offer
a statement of the business judgment rule at all, stating only that its elements "and the circumstances for
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business judgment rule and the doctrine of "corporate waste" been clarified.,'
Nonetheless, it is not the purpose of this Article to suggest radical reformations of
these doctrines, however appropriate. At least in the context of evaluating executive
compensation, other existing but largely-ignored rules can bear the weight of
rational analysis when the rules governing directors' duties cannot."
A.

The Business Judgment Rule and Its Exceptions

As with all decisions by the board of directors and its committees, the protection of the business judgment rule nominally extends to executive compensation
decisions as well. 93 The business judgment rule is in essence a presumption that the
corporation's directors have fulfilled their statutory duties of care, and it may be
rebutted only by a showing of lack of information, good faith, or the honest belief
that the action was in the corporation's best interest. 4
In practice, however, two doctrines operate to preclude judicial deference to
decisions of the board of directors under the business judgment rule. 95 First, the
decision may involve self-dealing.96 Because self-dealing is typically considered to be

its application are continuing to be developed by the courts." MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT, supra note 7,
§ 8.30 official cmt. The American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance have offered a
codification of the business judgment rule in the context of the duty of care, but note that "courts have
not expressed it this way." PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 7, § 4.01(c) cmt. a. The
latter's restatement of the business judgment rule has been and will continue to be the subject of much
controversy. See DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF
CORPORATE DIRECTORS 23-26 (3d ed. 1989).
91. See infra notes 130-131 and accompanying text.
92. See infra parts IV-V.
93. See CLARK, supra note 4, at 123-24. The Delaware Supreme Court has noted specifically the
"directors' broad corporate power to fix the compensation of officers." Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,
817 (Del. 1984).
94. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (providing a general statement of business judgment rule); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (rebutting the presumptions
of the rule). See generally BLOCK ET AL., supra note 90, at 2-12 (stating the general rule and citing
cases).
95. The following two exceptions have been generally recognized. See Vagts, supra note 10, at
268-69; Note, Executive Compensation in Close Corporations: The Need for a Modified Judicial
Approach to the Reasonableness Test, 1972 DUKE L.J. 1251, 1260.
96. Most state corporation laws define self-dealing decisions as those between the corporation and a
director or between interested corporations. Thirteen states expressly extend their conflict-of-interest statutes to contracts between the corporation and an officer and would cover executive compensation
decisions. See DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 144 (1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6304 (1988); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12:84 (West 1969); ME.REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A, § 717 (West 1981); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 450.1543 (West 1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.327 (Vernon 1991); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.140 (1991);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.60 (Baldwin Supp. 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1030 (West 1986);
15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1728 (Supp. 1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-37.1 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 48-18-302 (1988); TEX. BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2-35.1 (West Supp. 1992). See also BLOCK ET AL.,
supra note 90, at 692-93.
The Model Act takes the position that it is unnecessary to include officers in conflicting-interest
statutes. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT, supra note 7, § 8.31 (1984, withdrawn 1988) & Ch. 8,
Subch. F, introductory cmt. 2 ("Conflicts of interest of non-director officers or employees of the corporation are dealt with by the law of agency prescribing loyalty of agent to principal."). See Norwood P.
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a violation of the fiduciary duty of loyalty rather than the duty of care,97 the business judgment rule does not apply.9 8 Although the common law rule in such cases
was that a self-dealing transaction was automatically voidable, 99 almost all states
have replaced this rule with statutes permitting self-dealing transactions if there has
been proper ratification by disinterested directors or shareholders, or if the transaction is "fair" to the corporation. 10 0 Even if properly ratified according to the statute,
however, the self-dealing transaction may still be invalidated under common law if
it is "unfair" to the corporation.' 01 Second, no corporation is generally permitted to
give away or "waste" its assets. 02 Thus, a court faced with a well-pleaded allegation of waste of assets through excessive compensation will not accord the directors'
decision the deference otherwise proscribed by the business judgment rule. 03 As
discussed below, both of these doctrines typically boil down to a test of fairness or
04
reasonableness.1

Beveridge, Jr., The Corporate Director's Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: Understanding the Self-Interested
Director Transaction, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 655, 670 (1992) (discussing relevant agency law principles).
Professor Beveridge concludes that "[blecause all agents are fiduciaries, everyone working for the corporation is a fiduciary, although most will have little occasion to exercise any fiduciary power." Id. at 687.
97. The duty of care is not a "distinctively" fiduciary duty:
[Miany persons, by virtue of the law or their own contractual undertakings, owe duties of
care to other persons with whom they have nonfiduciary relationships. For example, motorists owe duties of care to pedestrians and to fellow motorists but are not, by virtue of these
relationships, under any fiduciary constraint in their pursuit of self-interest!
Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 915.
Accord, Beveridge, supra note 96, at 656. Most commentators fail to distinguish between the two. See
infra note 182.
98. See CLARK, supra note 4, at 124.
99. Id. at 160 (citing Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 Bus. LAW. 35 (1966)). See also Dale A. Oesterle, Limits on a Corporation's
Protection of its Directors and Officers from Personal Liability, 1983 Wis. L. REv. 513, 545 n.91
("Originally, a strict self-dealing disqualification rule controlled: if a director participated in setting his
own salary as a director or officer, the resolution was void."). Professor Beveridge vigorously disputes this
traditional proposition, and contends that accurate historical analysis proves it "completely erroneous."
Beveridge, supra note 96, at 659-62.
100. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 90, at 691-93 (listing 47 states with such statutes). See also
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT, supra note 7, § 8.61 (1988) & § 8.31 (1984, withdrawn 1988).
101. See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
102. See Vagts, supra note 10, at 268 and cases cited infra note 121.
103. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 817 (Del. 1984); 2 WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD, supra
note 9, at 852; BLOCK ET AL., supra note 90, at 2; Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment Rule in
Overview, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 615, 621 (1984) ("The classic case law position has been that the [business
judgment] rule does not protect the directors if they commit an act of corporate 'waste.' No one denies
that proposition.").
104. See infra part IV.A.3. Of course, even if these exceptions do not apply, the defendants may
not be in for smooth sailing. They must still establish the prerequisite information and good faith to
invoke the presumption of the business judgment rule. See Gaillard v. Natomas Co., 256 Cal. Rptr. 702,
716 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). In addition, there are older cases where the court simply refuses to recognize
the business judgment rule. See Gallin v. National City Bank, 273 N.Y.S. 87 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1934).
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1. Self-Dealing

If self-dealing is involved, many states have statutes that protect the contract
between the corporation and the interested party from the common law rule of automatic voidability. 10 5 This protection is available if one of three tests is met.
First, the corporation may be able to prove ratification by a disinterested board
or committee of the board.' 06 In most public corporations, such a committee is
charged with the executive compensation decisions, 107 foreclosing further attack on
this ground. However, the board may have failed to take this precaution, or in the
case of most closely-held corporations, all of the directors are interested officers as
well. 108
Failing approval by disinterested directors, approval by disinterested shareholders is the second method to save a compensation decision from automatic
voidability.'0 0 In publicly-held corporations, this option is rarely invoked for that
purpose; approval by a properly disinterested board has usually done the job. Nonetheless, shareholder approval of compensation is often sought for other purposes." 0
In a closely-held corporation, disinterested shareholder approval is likely impossible
for the same reason that disinterested board approval is impossible-the shareholders are directors and officers as well.
Finally, the executive compensation decision can be saved from automatic
voidability as self-dealing if it is shown to be "fair" to the corporation."' As indicated above, this is the only practical alternative in closely-held corporations.
Regardless of statutes removing the automatic voidability of self-dealing transactions, there remains, at least in Delaware, a more fundamental corollary rule from
common law. While a transaction may be saved from automatic voidability if it is
fair, it will nonetheless be invalidated if it is unfair."' Apparently only Delaware

105. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
106. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT, supra note 7, § 8.62 (1988) & § 8.31(c) (1984, withdrawn
1988). In addition, since challenges to executive compensation by a small shareholder are invariably
derivative actions, and thus must meet the requirement of demand made on the corporation or excused as
futile, approval by a disinterested board may also be effective after the fact in the context of an independent litigation committee's decision to refuse an objecting shareholder's derivative suit. See Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984).
107. See CRYSTAL, supra note 27, at 214.
108. See Note, supra note 95, at 1256.
109. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT, supra note 7, § 8.63 (1988) & § 8.31(d) (1984, withdrawn
1988); Shareholder approval may also be relevant in the derivative suit context, see supra note 106, in
those states where demand on the shareholders is required in addition to a demand on the board of
directors; Smith v. Dunlap, I ll So. 2d 1,5 (Ala. 1959).
110. For example, shareholder approval of certain stock option, rights and other incentive compensation plans may be necessary to secure an exemption from the short-swing trading prohibitions of
Securities Exchange Act § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988). See Securities Exchange Act Rule 16b3(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3(b) (1992).
Ill. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT, supra note 7, § 8.63(b)(3) (1988) & § 8.31 (a)(3) (1984,
withdrawn 1988).
112. See Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 222 (Del. 1976); CLARK, supra note 4, at 170
(noting that either under the statute or the reasoning in Fliegler, "'the transaction stands or falls
depending on whether it is fair").
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but it is nonetheless significant

because of the number of public corporations incorporated in Delaware and because

"self-dealing," as defined in the statutes considered above, extends in Delaware to
contracts between the corporation and its officers. 114

These dual requirements of "fairness" in self-dealing transactions have created
an apparently nimble burden of proof. 115 Allocation of the burden is important since

the law demands proof of a subjective standard, fairness, which is difficult to prove.
When there has been no ratification, the burden will be on the defendant directors
to prove, under applicable statutes, the fairness of the transaction. 6 In the second
type of case, however, where the self-dealing transaction is challenged as unfair
regardless of the statutory rules of voidability, 1 7 the burden of proof is on the plain-

tiff. Hence, courts sometimes speak of shareholder ratification as "shifting" the
burden of proof from defendants to plaintiffs.11 8
2.

Corporate Waste

The business judgment rule does not protect a decision that appears to be a
"waste" of corporate assets.1 9 Courts often state this proposition, though it is not at
all clear why waste should be considered apart from the business judgment rule,
rather than as prima facie or even conclusive evidence of failure to meet the prereq-

113. There is some suggestion that other states, California in particular, might follow a similar
rule. See EDWARD BRODSKY & M. PATRICIA ADAMSKI, LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS
§ 3:05 & n.10 (1992).

114.

See

DEL. CODE ANN.

tit. 8, § 144 (1991).

115. See Beveridge, supra note 96, at 671-73.
116. See Wilderman v. Wilderman, 315 A.2d 610, 615 (Del. Ch. 1974); Crowley v. Communications for Hosp., Inc., 573 N.E.2d 996, 1000 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991); Fendelman v. Fenco Handbag Mfg.
Co., 482 S.W.2d 461, 463 (Mo. 1972); Binz v. St. Louis Hide & Tallow Co., 378 S.W.2d 228, 230-32
(Mo. Ct. App. 1964); Lynch v. Patterson, 701 P.2d 1126, 1133 (Wyo. 1985). But see Krukemeier v.
Krukemeier Mach. & Tool Co., 551 N.E.2d 885, 888 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (placing burden of proof
on plaintiff challenging executive compensation, citing other jurisdictions which do so, and noting
"[tlhere is no general agreement as to which party bears the burden of proof when a minority shareholder challenges the reasonableness of compensation").
117. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
118. See, e.g., Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 224 (Del. 1979); see also Cohen v. Ayers, 596
F.2d 733, 739-40 (7th Cir. 1979) (applying New York law and holding that shareholder ratification also
invokes the presumption of the business judgment rule in favor of defendants). But see Hanrahan v.
Kruidenier, 473 N.W.2d 184, 188 (Iowa 1991) (placing the burden of proof on defendants to prove
reasonableness of compensation program even though ratified by disinterested committee of the board of
directors). See generally Oesterle, supra note 99, at 545 n.91. Oesterle states:
The legal effect of these procedures varies in the common law from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Do the procedures constitute additional evidence of fairness? Do they shift the burden
of persuasion on fairness? Do they shift the standard from unreasonableness to waste? Or
do they preclude judicial investigation into fairness absent fraud or other exigent
circumstances?.

119.

See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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uisites of the rule"' or as a failure to fulfill the duty of care itself.
Despite these analytical shortcomings, an attack upon executive compensation
as a waste of assets suffers from none of the limitations placed by the law on an
attack on the same compensation as self-dealing. No consideration of ratification is
necessary, as courts have consistently held that no group can ratify a waste of
assets. 21' The earliest cases involving challenges to executive compensation
proceeded on this theory, and the courts, though initially unwilling to invalidate the
compensation, expressly affirmed their equitable power to do so.' 22 A further

distinction of the action for waste is that a complaining shareholder might not only
2
" but may by statute in most states seek dissolution of the corporecover damages,'
24

ration as well.'

Most courts evaluating executive compensation alleged to be a waste of corporate assets impose two requirements to approve the compensation: there must be
consideration passing to the corporation in exchange for the compensation, and it
must bear a "reasonable relationship" to the benefits received by the corporation.126
120. See supra text accompanying note 94 (discussing prerequisites of the business judgment rule:
full information, good faith, and an honest belief that the action taken was in the corporation's best
interests).
121. See Cohen v. Ayers, 596 F.2d 733, 739-40 (7th Cir. 1979) (applying New York law);
McQuillen v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 27 F. Supp. 639, 651 (D. Md. 1939), af'd, 112 F.2d 877 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 695 (1940); Gaillard v. Natomas Co., 256 Cal. Rptr. 702, 716-17 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1989); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 817 (Del. 1984); Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 223
(Del. 1979); Eliasberg v. Standard Oil Co., 92 A.2d 862, 871 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1952), affd
mem., 97 A.2d 437 (N.J. 1953). Courts often state that the unanimous consent of the shareholders would
ratify an act of waste. See, e.g., Galler v. Galler, 203 N.E.2d 577, 587 (11). 1964) (dismissing a challenge
to contract as beyond the corporation's power when contract was signed by all the shareholders); Gottlieb
v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 90 A.2d 660, 665 (Del. 1952) (dictum). Such unanimous shareholder consent
would of course be impossible in a publicly-traded corporation. Furthermore, it is not likely that stockholder consent would bind other plaintiffs, such as creditors, challenging excessive compensation. See,
e.g., Glenmore Distilleries Co. v. Seideman, 267 F. Supp. 915, 920 (E.D.N.Y. 1967) (finding payments
of salary recoverable by creditors of corporation).
122. See Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653, 679-80 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 32 N.Y.S.2d 131
(App. Div. 1941). See also Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 591 (1933) (affirming power to investigate
waste and remanding for such a determination). Rogers was settled upon remand from the Supreme
Court. 2 WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD, supra note 9, at 883-85.
123. See infra part IIL.C for a discussion of the defendants liable in actions for waste or
conflicting-interest transactions.
124. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT, supra note 7, § 14.30(2)(iv), 3 MODEL BUSINESS CORP
ACT ANN. 1535 (1992). See, e.g., Gianotti v. Hamway, 387 S.E.2d 725 (Va. 1990) (discussing an action
for dissolution based in part on waste of assets due to excessive executive compensation).
125. Beard v. Elster, 160 A.2d 731, 737-38 (Del. 1960). Accord Freedman v. Barrow, 427 F. Supp.
1129, 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Ash v. Brunswick Corp., 405 F. Supp. 234, 240-43 (D. Del. 1975); Smith
v. Dunlap, I I So.2d I, 4 (Ala. 1959); Lieberman v. Becker, 155 A.2d 596, 598 (Del. 1959); Kaufman v.
Shoenberg, 91 A.2d 786, 792-94 (Del. Ch. 1952); Amdur v. Meyer, 224 N.Y.S.2d 440, 443 (App. Div.
1962). See also Norris v. Weir, 520 N.E.2d 10, 16 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (applying similar rule under
statute that removes executive compensation decisions from self-dealing challenges).
One court recently reformulated this test into a three-part test, analyzing: (I) benefit to the corporation; (2) whether the compensation was "unreasonably disproportionate" to the benefit; and (3) whether
the services rendered triggered the payments in question. International Ins. Co. v. Johns, 874 F.2d 1447,
1461 (1th Cir. 1989).
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The first requirement, that of some consideration, has rarely proved a significant
stumbling block for compensation plans. Courts have invalidated only compensation
that was clearly in consideration for past services 12 6 or that required no future
service by the employee. 127 Even when corporations amend their stock option plans
12 8
by gratuitous changes in favor of the executives, courts have found consideration.
known as the "reasonable relationship" or more simply the
The second requirement,
"reasonableness" test,'1 9 bears most of the load of judicial analysis.
3.

Analysis of Reasonableness

Under either of the above doctrines that preclude application of the business
judgment rule to decisions about executive compensation-self-dealing or corporate
waste-the analysis usually comes down to finding a reasonable relation between the
amount of compensation given to the executive and the benefit. received by the
corporation in return.1 30 This is what makes the transaction "fair" to the corporation under a self-dealing analysis, and it is at the same time what makes the
transaction not a waste of assets. However, courts often skip the first logical step,
failing to state whether the challenge is based on self-dealing or waste of assets. The
resulting analysis is thus usually the same under either legal rule.''

126. See Moore v. Keystone Macaroni Mfg. Co., 87 A.2d 295, 297-99 (Pa. 1952) (invalidating
payments to widow of deceased president of corporation).
127. Early stock option plans were invalidated if the options granted did not require that the
grantee remain in the corporation's employ for some future period. See Kerbs v. California Eastern
Airways, Inc., 90 A.2d 652, 656-57 (Del. 1952), discussed in Beard v. Elster, 160 A.2d 731, 738 (Del.
1960). Plans requiring such future service have been uniformly held to have consideration. See, e.g., Ash
v. Brunswick Corp., 405 F. Supp. 234, 240-42 (D. Del. 1975); Holthusen v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co.,
52 F. Supp. 125 (E.D. Pa. 1943) (invalidating stock option plan); 53 F. Supp. 488 (E.D. Pa. 1943)
(upholding same plan after amendment to require one year's employment before exercise of options
permitted); Beard, 160 A.2d at 738; Kaufman v. Shoenberg, 91 A.2d 786, 792-93 (Del. 1952); Gottlieb
v. .Heyden Chem. Corp., 99 A.2d 507, 509 (Del. Ch. 1953).
128. See Cohen v. Ayers, 596 F.2d 733, 742 (7th Cir. 1979) (reduction of the exercise price of
stock options); Freedman v. Barrow, 427 F. Supp. 1129, 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (extension of time for
exercise of options); Amdur v. Meyer, 224 N.Y.S.2d 440, 443 (App. Div. 1962).(reduction of option
exercise price to account for stock dividend).
129. See, e.g., Note, supra note 95.
130. See Oesterle, supra note 99, at 545 n.91 ("The current standard is easy to state and very
difficult to apply."); Manning, supra note 103, at 621 ("Efforts to develop a functional vocabulary to
identify 'waste' have been as unsuccessful as corresponding efforts to give operational meaning to the
concept of 'obscenity.' ").
131. Washington and Rothschild noted simply that "[glenerally, the basis of the decision is not
stated with clarity." 2 WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD, supra note 9, at 853.
Professor Clark disagrees, arguing that the difference in terminology between self-dealing cases and
waste-of-asset cases "marks a real difference in judicial practices," because courts rarely use a selfdealing analysis. CLARK, supra note 4, at 192. However, this assertion overlooks cases such as those at
supra note 116, where in each instance (except the last) the court held the compensation invalid. And
there are other cases in which, although the compensation is upheld, the court gives serious consideration
to the claim of self-dealing. See, e.g., Hingle v. Plaquemines Oil Sales Corp., 399 So. 2d 646, 651 (La.
Ct. App.), cert. denied, 401 So. 2d 987 (La. 1981); Bookman v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 48 A.2d
646, 691 (N.J. Ch. 1946). Thus, analysis of executive compensation as self-dealing seems to be more
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Courts implicitly recognize the different theories when allocating the burden of
proof in these cases, however. When the action is brought challenging as selfdealing an executive compensation package not ratified by the board of directors or
the shareholders, the burden is placed on the defendant directors, but shifts to the
plaintiffs if there is ratification. 3 ' When the action is brought challenging the
33
compensation as a waste of assets, however, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff.
However, this recognition is forgotten in some cases in which courts, in determining
the reasonableness of compensation, invoke the business judgment rule in deference
to the board's consideration of reasonableness, 3 " although the cases arise in the first
place only because the business judgment rule is inapplicable. i3 Placement of this
tra'nsient burden of proof is further evidence of the failure of courts to provide an
analytically robust theory of duties of care and loyalty. 3 6
Once courts somehow place the burden of proof and determine the degree of
deference, if any, due the board's decision, they will evaluate the actual reasonableness of the compensation. Courts employ differing analyses depending on whether
the compensation challenged involves the payment of straightforward salaries and
bonuses, or stock options and rights, which are more difficult to value.'
Cash
payments to executives are evaluated against a number of factors,"3 8 the most
frequently mentioned being compensation of similar executives in other companies
in the same industry, 39 the success of the company as determined by various finanrobust than contemplated by Professor Clark. Later in this same discussion, he notes that "[a]n officer is
ill advised to be present and vote at the directors' meeting where his compensation is set," thus apparently recognizing the importance of self-dealing to the courts. CLARK, supra note 4, at 194.
In their earlier analysis of compensation decisions in close corporations, Washington and Rothschild
noted that " '[slelf-dealing' . . . has been the single most important factor in persuading courts to hold
compensation unreasonable," though that fact alone "will not of itself result in a determination of unreasonableness." 2 WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD, supra note 9, at 865.
132. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
133. See, e.g., Smith v. Dunlap, Ill So. 2d 1, 5 (Ala. 1959).
134. See Ash v. Brunswick Corp., 405 F. Supp. 234, 243 (D. Del. 1975); McQuillen v. National
Cash Register Co., 27 F. Supp. 639, 653 (D. Md. 1939) (noting that compensation that is not wasteful
but merely excessive, resulting "from poor judgment, not necessarily from anything else" is not subject to
challenge), aft'd, 112 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1940); Beard v. Elster, 160 A.2d 731, 738 (Del. 1960); BLOCK
ET AL.,

supra note 90, at 87-88 & n.61;

MORTIMER

FEUER.

PERSONAL LIABILITIES OF CORPORATE

OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS 50 (1961) ("Many of the principles ...

set forth [in conflict-of-interest situa-

tions] are applicable to such compensation questions; but not all-for . . . the 'business judgment' rule is
held to have an impact on compensation arrangements, which it does not have on other transactions
between an independently represented corporation and interested directors-an impact that reduces the
scope of the court's scrutiny of such arrangements.").
135. See supra text accompanying note 95.
136. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
137. Professor Vagts similarly divided his analysis between traditional compensation (in public and
close corporations) and incentive plans. See Vagts, supra note 10, at 252-57, 261-66. The public-close
corporation distinction is discussed infra in part III.B.
138.
ELLIG,

See generally factors listed in 2 WASHINGTON &

ROTHSCHILD,

supra note 9, at 856-61;

supra note 67, at 299; and Lynch v. Patterson, 701 P.2d 1126, 1133 (Wyo. 1985).

139. See 2 WASHINGTON

& ROTHSCHILD,

supra note 9, at 856 & n.24 (citing cases); ELLIG, supra

note 67, at 299; Winkelman v. General Motors Corp., 44 F. Supp. 960, 970 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Wilderman v. Wilderman, 315 A.2d 610, 615 (Del. Ch. 1974); Hingle v. Plaquemines Oil Sales Corp., 399
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and the absolute
the focus on the
is misguided, and
available to the

complaining minority shareholder. 4"
Compensation under stock option, restricted stock, and similar incentive plans
is given a less-searching analysis by courts, presumably because of the difficulty in
valuing the consideration given by the corporation, 14 a problem obviously not
present in cash compensation cases. Consideration for the grant of the stock option
or right is usually found in the executive's promise to remain in office in order to
exercise the option or right. 4, 5 When existing options are modified favorably to the
14 6
executive, however, courts simply assume consideration otherwise not apparent.
Turning to the evaluation of the adequacy of the consideration, some courts have
recognized that the link between the executive's performance and any increase in

So. 2d 646, 648 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 401 So. 2d 987 (La. 1981); Miller v. Magline, Inc., 256
N.W.2d 761, 768 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977); Fendelman v. Fenco Handbag Mfg. Co., 482 S.W.2d 461, 467
(Mo. 1972); Ruetz v. Topping, 453 S.W.2d 624, 631 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970); Gallin v. National City Bank,
281 N.Y.S. 795, 804 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
140. See 2 WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD, supra note 9, at 857 & n.28 (observing "[ilncreases in
sales, profits, assets, capital, surplus, and the like" are considered in the cases, though noting that "[t]he
significance of such factors has not always been made evident"); Winkelman, 44 F. Supp. at 970 (growth
of and return on assets); Wilderman, 315 A.2d at 615 (general success of company); Hingle, 399 So. 2d
at 649 (return on assets); Crowley v. Communications for Hosp., Inc., 573 N.E.2d 996, 1000 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1991) (gross revenues or net income before taxes); Miller, 256 N.W.2d at 768 (basis for
measuring success not stated); Bookman v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 48 A.2d 646, 691-92 (N.J. Ch.
1946) (return on assets and equity, stock price, and dividends); Gallin, 281 N.Y.S. at 803-04 (surplus,
earnings, and deposits).
141. See Koplar v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 19 F. Supp. 173, 188 (D. Del. 1937); Wilderman,
315 A.2d at 615; Fendelman, 482 S.W.2d at 466-67; Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653, 675-78 (Sup.
Ct.), aff'd mem., 32 N.Y.S.2d 131 (App. Div. 1941); Lynch, 701 P.2d at 1133-34.
142. See 2 WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD, supra note 9, at 861 (suggesting size of payments is a
factor, but "few opinions, if any, expressly rely on size in the abstract as a determinative factor, and its
influence, if any, is an unexpressed one"); Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 591 (1932) (stating that "the
payments . . . have become so large as to warrant investigation in equity in the interest of the
company"); Winkelman, 44 F. Supp. at 970 (concluding that plaintiffs failed to show that compensation
was unreasonably excessive); Kerbs v. California E. Airways, Inc., 90 A.2d 652, 658 (Del. 1952) (finding
payments under profit-sharing plan "[in view of the present earnings of the corporation ... do not seem
shockingly large").
143. See Note, supra note 95, at 1270-73. See also ELLIG, supra note 67, at 299 (listing "[n]o or
low dividends" as a factor indicating unreasonable levels of compensation in priately-held companies).
144. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
146. See Cohen v. Ayers, 596 F.2d 733, 742-43 (7th Cir. 1979) (applying New York law and
holding that original consideration supports modification of terms); Freedman v. Barrow, 427 F. Supp.
1129, 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (invoking business judgment rule to preclude analysis of consideration);
Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 625 (Del. 1984) (stating that consideration, though "ephemeral," is
"implicit" in all stock option plans); Amdur v. Meyer, 224 N.Y.S.2d 440, 444 (App. Div. 1962) (noting
that "the benefit conferred may be 'incapable of measurement except in terms of business judgment' ")
(quoting Beard v. Elster, 160 A.2d 731, 736 (Del. 1960)).
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stock price is doubtful."' " However, courts more frequently brazenly finesse the
question, noting the difficulty of valuing such options and rights and relying on the
assumed expert judgment of the directors," 8 even though it is the adequacy of that
very judgment that is at issue.
B.

The Close-Public CorporationDistinction

Although the legal rules discussed above apply regardless of the size of the
corporation, commentators have universally recognized that closely-held or "close"

corporations fare differently than publicly-held or "public" corporations.

49

Nonju-

dicial restraints, such as the disclosures required by the federal securities laws,
operate implicitly to limit executive compensation in public corporations. 1 0 Close
corporations rarely employ outside directors or officers, with the result in most cases
that decisions on executive compensation always involve self-dealing."' The result is
that courts in public corporation cases are more frequently able to impose processoriented rules, such as disinterested director approval, and most often uphold executive compensation decisions, while in close corporation decisions, none of these rules
are available to preclude direct application of the "reasonableness" test. 52 This
distinction and the disparate results continue today; courts do occasionally strike

147. See Berkwitz v. Humphrey, 163 F. Supp. 78, 91 (N.D. Ohio 1958) (holding that "'the postulate that an increase in the market value of the stock is attributable solely to the extraordinary services
rendered by [the executives] in response to the incentive of additional compensation ... is demonstrably
false"). See also Rosenthal v. Burry Biscuit Corp., 60 A.2d 106, 110 (Del. Ch. 1948) (stating that an
executive with the possibility of stock ownership on top of a substantial salary and bonus cannot result in
a substantially intensified effort by the executive).
148. See Holthusen v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., 53 F. Supp. 488, 490-91 (E.D. Pa. 1943); Beard
v. Elster, 160 A.2d 731, 738 (Del. 1960); Lieberman v. Becker, 155 A.2d 596, 600-01 (Del. 1959);
Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 99 A.2d 507, 509-10 (Del. Ch. 1953); Kaufman v. Shoenberg, 91 A.2d
786, 794 (Del. Ch. 1952). See also Barris, supra note 23, at 83 ("[D]etermination of the adequacy of
consideration is committed to the 'sound business judgment of the corporation's directors.' In short,
whatever the corporation deems adequate, the court will deem adequate.") (quoting Cohen, 596 F.2d at
739).
149. See 2 WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD, supra note 9, at 849 ("The law, implicitly recognizing
").
the practical distinction [between close and public corporations], has followed divergent paths ....
150. Note, supra note 95, at 1253-57. In proposing revisions to its disclosure rules regarding executive compensation, the SEC noted that it is attempting "to enhance the workings of market forces with
respect to executive pay." Executive Compensation Disclosure, supra note 14, at 29,583.
151. Professor Clark suggests that courts have not adopted a categorical rule invalidating executive
compensation unless approved by disinterested directors because such a rule would not be suitable for
close corporations. CLARK, supra note 4, at 219-21.
152. Professor Vagts summarized the distinction evident in the reported cases:
Only a handful of cases actually show the courts grappling with the question-how much is
too much-in the context of a large public corporation. . . . The courts in [close corporation] cases . . . tend to roll up their sleeves and grapple with the task of finding a fair
market value for the services rendered.
Vagts, supra note 10, at 252-53, 256. See also Moran v. Edson, 493 F.2d 400, 405-06 (3d Cir. 1974);
O'Malley v. Casey, 589 P.2d 1388, 1389 (Colo. Ct. App. 1979) (recognizing that conflict-of-interest
statutes will rarely be an issue in close corporations, and "'reasonableness" is the only appropriate test).
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down compensation in cases involving close corporations, 5 ' but no modern case
a court upsetting a public corporation executive compensation arhas found 54
rangement.
The close-public distinction in courts' analyses highlights the importance of
recognizing the corporate officer's independent duties in public corporation cases. In
close corporation cases, courts are frequently, if not universally, drawn to consider
the defendants' duties, typically as director or controlling shareholder, so separate
analysis of those duties as an officer would be redundant.' 55 In public corporation
cases, however, the only role played by the recipient of the compensation is that of
officer. There is therefore a more compelling need to consider the separate duties
that attach to the recipient as an officer only.' 56 The failure to do so has led to the
current public outrage over executive compensation.
C. Applications Under Other Laws
Courts routinely examine the propriety of executive compensation in cases
arising otherwise than by shareholder suits invoking the duties of the directors,
shareholders or officers. Putting aside the fact that recoveries under these laws will
not necessarily be made by the corporation or its shareholders, the policies underlying each of these laws are likely sufficiently distinct to preclude their application
in the state corporation law context. Nonetheless, they do serve as examples, worthy
of examination of the courts' willingness to grapple with directors' and executives'
judgments of reasonableness, in contrast to the deference without analysis given by
the business judgment rule under state corporation law.
Compensation paid by a corporation to its executives may be an expense
deductible by the corporation in calculating its income subject to federal tax.157 Not
surprisingly, a body of case law has arisen under this rule that is "the largest, most
varied, and interesting store of information about markets for executives and their
compensation that59 is available."' 5 8 And since the statutory standard is one of
"reasonableness,"'
similar to that used in the cases decided under state corpora-

153. See, e.g., Crowley v. Communications for Hosps., Inc., 573 N.E.2d 996 (Mass. App. Ct.
1991); Gianotti v. Hamway, 387 S.E.2d 725 (Va. 1990); Lynch v. Patterson, 701 P.2d 1126 (Wyo.
1985).
154. Vagts, supra note 10, at 254-55. The lone possible exception since Professor Vagts' article is
Gaillard v. Natomas Co., 256 Cal. Rptr. 702 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989), which did not impose liability on the
corporation and directors, but reversed the lower court's summary judgment in their favor.
155. In close corporation cases courts often speak of the fiduciary duties of officers, directors, and
controlling shareholders, but not of officers acting in that capacity alone in receipt of excessive compensation. See 2 F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON. O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY
SHAREHOLDERS § 7:03 (1991). An individual's status as an officer in a close corporation seems to be an
afterthought. The law attaches consequential fiduciary duties to the more clearly "control" positions of
director or majority shareholder. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close
Corporations, 138 U. PA. L. REV 1675. 1688-90 (1990).
156. For a full discussion of this duty, see infra parts IV-V.
157. See I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (1988): 26 C.F.R. § 1.162-7 (1992).
158. Vagts, supra note 10, at 258.
159. I.R.C. § 162(a) (1988) provides for deduction, in calculating taxable income, of "all the ordi-
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tion law,' 60 courts in tax cases successfully analyze questions finessed in the
corporation law context.'"" Recent cases continue this trend of substantive analysis
based on a flexible list of factors.'6 2 However, because the legitimate focus of the
government and the courts in these cases is only upon tax laws and policies, 63 the
applicability of these "reasonableness" decisions to state corporation law is dubious
at best.' 6 "
The amount of executive compensation is also an issue in cases involving reor-

nary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business, including-( 1) a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services
actually rendered."
160. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
161. See Vagts, supra note 10, at 260-61.
162. The list of factors considered typically begins with those in Mayson Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 178 F.2d 115, 119 (6th Cir. 1949): employee's qualifications; nature, extent, and scope of work;
size and complexities of the business; salaries compared with gross and net income; prevailing general
economic conditions; salaries compared with distributions to stockholders; prevailing rates of compensation for comparable positions in comparable concerns; salary policy of the corporation's employees; and,
for smaller corporations, the compensation paid to the individual in past years. See, e.g., I BORIS I.
BITTKER. FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS 22-21 to 22-22 (1981); Rutter v. Commissioner, 853 F.2d 1267, 1271-75 & 1271 n.7 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing similar lists of factors applied in other
circuits); Owensby & Kritikos, Inc. v. Commissioner, 819 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir. 1987); Kennedy v.
Commissioner, 671 F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 1982).
One researcher analyzed 75 reported Tax Court cases involving compensation for the statistical
significance of the Mayson factors, concluding that those factors explain 87% of the variance in the
decisions made by the court. Those variables with the highest explanatory values were average compensation paid in prior years, sales, employee qualifications, and scope of the employee's duties. Joseph L.
Boyd, An Empirical Investigation of Reasonable Compensation Determination in Closely-Held Corporations (1977) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of South Carolina).
62
163. Professor Bittker argues that the "reasonableness" portion of § 1 (a)(1) may be redundant,
as it is simply another way of stating that the allowance is only for compensation for services,
"forbid[ding] the deduction of payments inflated to disguise a nondeductible transfer." BITTKER, supra
note 162, at 22-19. See also Trinity Quarries, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 205, 210-11 (11th Cir.
1982) (focusing primarily on whether large compensation is a disguised dividend); Builders Ctr., Inc. v.
United States, 571 F. Supp. 83, 87 (M.D. La. 1983) (noting that the government is "ever vigilant to
ensure that no return on investment is disguised as personal compensation. The ultimate objective, of
course, is to see to it that corporate dividends are paid only with after-tax dollars, as the Congress has
prescribed."). Such a characterization of the payments is not relevant in a corporation law context
analyzing the directors' and officers' duties, apart from considering whether minority shareholders in a
close corporation have been "frozen out" from a reasonable investment return. See Note, supra note 95.
164. As discussed above, the focus of the tax law is to expose nondeductible transfers masquerading as deductible salaries, and only incidentally on the reasonableness of the payments. Although
Professor Bittker posits that it is impossible to separately analyze "whether an amount is paid for services
and whether it is reasonable in amount," BITTKER, supra note 162, at 22-20, he lists six of the most
significant Mayson factors, at least three of which-employer's earnings, ownership, and employer's dividend policy-are focused on matters more related to the nature of the payment than its reasonableness.
Id. at 22-23 to 22-26. Washington & Rothschild observed that "[tihe taxing authorities have not stressed
,excessiveness' of compensation as such or sought to substitute their views for those of the corporate
taxpayer with regard to what constitutes good corporate practice or sound social policy. Rather, the point
of view of the tax authorities has been revenue-conscious." 2 WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD, supra note
9, at 760.
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ganization under the Bankruptcy Code.165 Courts routinely examine compensation

paid to officers of operating debtor corporations in reorganization, 6 ' as well as

claims by officers for compensation due prior to the bankruptcy filing.16 Payments
made by the bankruptcy trustee after commencement of the case are measured by
necessity and governed by the trustee's duty; prefiling employment contracts do not
govern this decision. 68 Absent specific claims by the trustee of breach of duty, the
duties of care and loyalty are rarely at issue in cases involving claims of employees
for services rendered prior to bankruptcy.169 Under nonbankruptcy law, creditors
may recover unreasonable compensation paid by insolvent corporations to their
executives.1 70 These cases, however, involve considerations of fraud, whether
inferred or actual, 17 1 and thus do not necessarily otherwise relate to an officer's or
director's positive duties of care and loyalty.
The amount of executive compensation may also be relevant in determination
of claims for Social Security benefits.' However, the objective under that law is to
assure that compensation is not understated.' 78 This policy is clearly dissimilar to
the policies underlying state corporation laws.
Federal and state laws limiting managerial compensation exist that govern

enterprises such as investment companies, 7' common carriers, 7 5 and insurance

165. I1 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. 1992).
166. Compensation for services rendered to an ongoing business after filing of the bankruptcy petition may be ordered by the court under 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1), providing for payments to "officers" of
the bankruptcy estate, or may be available under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(l)(A), providing for payment of
"the actual and necessary costs of preserving the estate, including wages, salaries or commissions for
services rendered after the commencement of the case." Analysis under § 330(a)(1) is usually limited to
compensation of outside professionals such as appraisers, accountants, and attorneys. See 2 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY
330.04 n.a (15th ed. 1992). The distinction is that payments under § 330(a) require prior
court approval, but payments under § 503(b)(l)(A) may not. See id.
167. Unless claims by a debtor corporation's employees fall within the exceptions of II U.S.C.
§ 507(a)(1) (administrative expenses incurred after commencement of the bankruptcy case) or §
507(a)(3) (certain wages earned within 90 days of commencement), those claims are treated equally with

all of the debtor's other general unsecured claims. 3 COLLIER

ON BANKRUPTCY

$ 503.04 n.23 (15th ed.

1992). See, e.g., In re Heritage Village Church & Missionary Fellowship, Inc., 92 B.R. 1000, 1021-22
(Bankr. D.S.C. 1988) (analyzing a claim under an alleged employment contract).
168. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 503.04 at 503-28 to 503-28.1 (15th ed. 1992). Generally, a
bankruptcy trustee will be able to avoid employment contracts under I I U.S.C. § 365(a), at least as to
wages and salaries. A more complicated question is presented by long-term and deferred compensation
arrangements. See, e.g., Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242 (1992).
169. See Heritage Village, 92 B.R. at 1014-18 (awarding trustee $1 million for counterclaims
based on breach of officers' and directors' fiduciary duties under South Carolina law).
170. See Glenmore Distillers Co. v. Seideman, 267 F. Supp. 915, 919-20 (E.D.N.Y. 1967)
(allowing recovery under New York fraudulent conveyance law).
171. See id. (involving two different sections of New York law permitting recovery either with or
without actual intent to defraud).
172. See Notini v. Heckler, 624 F. Supp. 552 (D. Mass. 1986).
173. For example, the issue in Notini was whether a recently retired executive was underpaid by
the corporation in an effort to maximize the available Social Security benefits. See id. at 554.
174. See § 36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1988),
discussed in Vagts, supra note 10, at 266-68 & n.157 (citing cases) and 2 TAMAR FRANKEL. THE REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS 279-85 (1978) (discussing suits under § 36(b)).
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companies.'
However, the focus of these statutes and the agencies and courts
implementing them is clearly on groups other than shareholders in a traditional
industrial corporation: ratepayers, insurance carriers and policyholders, and mutual
fund shareholders. 1 7 Any coincidence in analysis in these cases has not been persuasive to any court considering the similar question raised under general corporation
law as applied to otherwise unregulated companies.

IV.

THE CORPORATE OFFICER'S INDEPENDENT DUTIES

The preceding parts of this Article have explained the problem of excessive
executive compensation, the economic incentives that create it, and the existing
legal rules that are largely powerless to combat it, especially in large publicly-held
corporations. To apply the corporate officer's independent duties to the question of
executive compensation, and determine whether those duties and the resulting rules
would yield better results, this part first reviews their curious history and current
status. A corporate officer's duty of care and duty of loyalty have long been implicit
in corporation law, but have been made explicit or separately considered by courts
in executive compensation decisions only recently.
A.

Origins

The earliest statements of the corporate officer's duties, in occasional cases and
in treatises, combine the duties of directors and officers. 78 Not only is the analysis
of officers' duties ignored or at best appended in the margin to a fuller analysis of
directors' duties, 7 9 but nonfiduciary and fiduciary elements are mixed indiscrimi-

175. See 2 WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD, supra note 9, at 788-94.
176. See id. at 791 & n.145. Although the statute cited was repealed, there are modern statutes
limiting executive compensation paid by insurance companies. See, e.g., WIs, STAT. ANN. § 611.63 (West
1980 & Supp. 1991), construed in Brogan v. Industrial Cas. Ins. Co., 392 N.W.2d 439 (Wis. Ct. App.
1986).
177. Professor Vagts, discussing management fee cases involving investment companies, concluded
that the failure of significant limitations leads one to ask "whether the market can be a meaningful
control on compensation in any context if not so in the . . . mutual fund . . . where the investors

confront the question of compensation in a more direct, uncomplicated way than do shareholders of an
operating business." Vagts, supra note 10, at 268. See also Subcommittee on Executive Compensation,
American Bar Association Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, Executive Compensation:
A 1987 Road Map for the Corporate Advisor, 43 Bus. LAW. 185, 406-15 (1987) (discussing distinct
policies underlying limits on executive compensation in the banking, insurance, and public utility
industries).
178. See, e.g., 2 SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON & JOSEPH W. THOMPSON. COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW
OF CORPORATIONS 794-95 (3d ed. 1927) (stating that the director's fiduciary duties consist of ordinary
care and good faith and noting only that "[tihis rule is of equal application to the directors and other
officers of the corporation"); I CHARLES F. BEACH. JR., COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 392-412 (1891) (chapter entitled "Fiduciary Position of Directors and Officers, and Herein of
Promoters" has no specific separate discussion of officers' duties except a notation on Pittsburg Mining
Co. v. Spooner, 42 N.W. 259, 260 (Wis. 1889), a case referring generically to "officers" of the corporation but only involving officer/directors).
179. "Where the issue of officers' liability has been discussed, it is almost invariably in the shadow
of directors' conduct." Sparks & Hamermesh, supra note 8,at 215. See also supra note 178 and accom-
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nately."8 OAnd when discussing executive compensation in particular, early writers
began focusing on the payer of the compensation to the exclusion of the recipient.' 81
Modern analysts have built upon this shaky foundation, rarely separating the
officer's duty from the director's, or the duty of care from the fiduciary duty of
loyalty.' 8 The result is an analytic "black box" into which facts are fed and from
which decisions emerge. Nothing is known about the process, though everyone
assumes its legitimacy. Given this confused history, it is perhaps no surprise that the
officer's independent duties have been largely ignored. To clarify the analysis, the
elements of the duties of care and loyalty are considered separately below. Imposing
some analytical rigor on existing caselaw concerning the duties of care and loyalty is
a difficult task, 83 but the purpose is to show that, whatever the current state of the
law, separate analysis of the officer's duties fits within and is compatible with it.
B.

The Duty of Care

The corporate officer's separate duty of care was first clearly stated only in

panying text. An excellent example is Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940). In the course of
a 60-page opinion discussing at length alleged violations of the duty of care by a corporation's directors,
Justice Shientag mentions only at one point, as if an afterthought, that three defendants, "while not
directors are liable as officers who actively participated in the transaction." Id. at 703. Perhaps nothing
more is said because the three defendants are ultimately saved from liability by the statute of limitations,
id. at 705, but still one would expect some statement of the nature of the officer's duty on which this
liability was predicated.
180. See supra note 178. Duties of care are not, strictly speaking, fiduciary duties. See DeMott,
supra note 97.
181. See, e.g., HENRY W. BALLANTINE. BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS 409 (1927) ("Both the
stockholders and directors, in fixing compensation of officers, must act in good faith, and reasonably.").
This is the substance of modern analysis as well, as the same sentence appears in 5A FLETCHER
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 80 (1987). Discussion of the officers specifically
focuses on their authority to bind the corporation with respect to their salaries and not the exercise of any
fiduciary duty. See 3 THOMPSON & THOMPSON, supra note 178, at 453-54.
182. Clark, for example, in discussing the duty of care, initially states the duty as one owed by
officers and directors, see CLARK, supra note 4, at 123, but the ensuing discussion focuses without explanation solely on directors, see id. at 123-40. Henn and Alexander follow a similar pattern. See HARRY G.
HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER. LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 612 (1983)
(general statement); id. at 614-15 (specific discussion of directors); id. at 621 (general statement); id. at
621-23 (discussion of directors). The authors' discussion of fiduciary duties in close corporations essentially omits the officer entirely. See supra note 155. Professor Hazen notes specifically that "[tlhe second
prong of managers' fiduciary duty is their duty of care." Thomas L. Hazen, The Corporate Persona,
Contract (and Market) Failure, and Moral Values, 69 N.C. L. REV. 273, 279 (1991). One possible
reason for this treatment is the confluence of facts in most cases. "Although a number of decisions
discuss the duty of care, most have arisen in the context of alleged breaches of the duty of loyalty. There
have been only a handful of cases invoking the duty of care in the absence of a conflict of interest." Id. at
279 n.35. Block has dropped separate consideration of officers altogether. Compare DENNIS J. BLOCK ET
AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS (3d ed. 1989), with
DENNIS J.BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS
AND OFFICERS (2d ed. 1988).
The notable exception is the focus on the officer's separate fiduciary duty in the specific contexts of
self-dealing and usurpation of corporate opportunities. See infra note 201 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
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18
1984, with the adoption of section 8.42 of the Model Business Corporation Act.
This section, new in the 1984 revision of the Model Act,"' parallels the older and
more familiar language stating an identical duty of care owed by directors. 86 The
drafters of the Model Act apparently felt the derivation of this separate duty from
the director's duty was obvious, as no separate justification is given. 8 This or
comparable language now appears in twenty-one states' corporation laws.' 8
Thus, it appears to be no stretch of now-settled authority that a corporate
officer owes a separate duty of care to the corporation. In cases of executive
compensation, as with all of the executive's other decisions, the compensation may
be received only if in good faith, with the care of an "ordinarily prudent person,"
and in the officer's reasonable belief, it is in the best interests of the corporation. 89
Although no court has directly ruled on such a theory, the governing principles can
be drawn directly from the identical duty owed to the corporation by its directors, as
the drafters of the Model Act themselves suggest. 8 0
The threshold question, as with cases involving directors, is the applicability of
the business judgment rule. Under current analysis, the rule's protection may be
unavailable either because the self-dealing removes the presumption itself, and
permits courts to directly consider the director's or officer's exercise of due care,''
or because the question is not one of the breach of the duty of care at all, but is only
a question of breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty, to which the business judgment
rule ordinarily does not apply."' Thus, although it is unknown why the business
judgment rule's protection is unavailable, it is possible that courts are confusing
duty of care analysis with duty of loyalty analysis, and if forced to consider the duty
of care alone, might conclude that the rule's protection is at least initially
available. 9

184.

MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT, supra note 7, § 8.42(a) states:

An officer with discretionary authority shall discharge his duties under that authority:
(1) in good faith;
(2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under
similar circumstances; and
(3) in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation.
Id.
185.

See 2 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. 1067 (1992).

186. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT, supra note 7, § 8.30(a).
187. See id. § 8.42 official cmt.
188. See 2 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. 1068 (1992) (listing statutory provisions).
189. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT, supra note 7, § 8.42(a).
190. See id. § 8.42 official cmt. (noting that the standards discussed with respect to the directors'
duties are "generally applicable to nondirector officers as well as to directors").
191. See CLARK, supra note 4, at 124.
192. The Principles of Corporate Governance do invoke the business judgment rule as do occasional cases. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 7, § 5.03(a)(2)-(3) and cases
cited supra note 134. However, the business judgment rule applies in these instances only to shield the
decision by the directors or other person authorizing the payment of compensation; nothing is said about
the decision of the recipient officer.
193. This is the logical conclusion if self-dealing is relegated to discussion under the duty of
loyalty. It may well be that the presence of self-dealing is only relevant evidence in a duty of care
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Assuming a court were to proceed on a strict duty of care analysis, and the
business judgment rule's presumption were to apply, the plaintiff'9 4 would be
required to prove one of the rule's prerequisites was not met by the defendant: full
information, good faith, and a belief that the challenged compensation is in the best
interests of the corporation.' 95 If one of these prerequisites is not met, the court
would directly consider the officer's conduct in relation to the duty of care. 9 6 To
date, however, the only one of these prerequisites carefully considered is the
adequacy of information before the decision-maker. 97 In executive compensation
cases, there would be little doubt that the officer is fully informed about all matters
concerning his or her own compensation. Indeed, the relative paucity of information
given the board compared with that available to the officer is a major market imper-

analysis if the presumption of the business judgment rule presumption is overcome. This is largely hypothetical analysis, however, because cases decided rarely if ever present a duty of care question separate
from evidence of self-dealing. See supra note 182. For example, in Platt v. Richardson, [1989-1990
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,786 (M.D. Pa. June 6, 1989), the court stated succinctly
that "[t]he business judgment rule applies only to directors of a corporation and not to officers." Id. at
94,231. However, the court had already determined that there were sufficient questions of self-dealing,
implicating the duty of loyalty, which would make the business judgment rule unavailable in any event.
Id. As to the broad statement of inapplicability of the business judgment rule to officers, Platt's statement has been relegated "to a distinct minority position." Sparks & Hamermesh, supra note 8, at 235.
194. The burden of proof in such cases is apparently upon the plaintiff to show that one or more of
the prerequisites to the business judgment rule are absent. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE,
supra note 7, § 4.01(d).
195. See Gaillard v. Natomas Co., 256 Cal. Rptr. 702, 716 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); see also Smith v.
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874 (Del. 1985) (discussing whether directors were fully informed in the
context of a sale of the corporation).
196. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 878-88 (concluding that business judgment rule does not apply
and proceeding to examine directly the directors' compliance with the duty of care).
197. In both Van Gorkom and Gaillard, the question was only whether the directors were fully
informed. The other prerequisites, good faith and an honest belief in the best interests of the corporation,
are only occasionally considered. See, e.g., Sugarman v. Sugarman, 797 F.2d 3, 10 (1st Cir. 1986)
(finding bad faith on the part of defendant director permits court not to defer to board's decision on his
compensation). The apparent identity of elements of the business judgment rule and of the underlying
duty of care itself has been the source of much confusion.
In [invoking the business judgment rule], courts have sometimes used language similar to
the standards set forth in section 8.30(a) (duty of care]. The elements of the business
judgment rule and the circumstances for its application are continuing to be developed by
the courts. In view of that continuing judicial development, section 8.30 does not try to
codify the business judgment rule or to delineate the differences, if any, between that rule
and the standards of director conduct set forth in this section. That is a task left to the
courts and possibly to later revisions of this Model Act.
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT

§ 8.30 official cmt. (1988). That task, at least as undertaken by the Princi-

ples of Corporate Governance, removed the "honest belief" prerequisite, the one most confusingly similar
to the duty of care itself, and requires only that the decision-maker be fully informed, without an

interest, and be acting in good faith.

PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOM-

§ 4.01(c) & cmts. d & e (Proposed Final Draft 1992). The prerequisite of good faith, in
turn, is satisfied at least where there is no illegality, though no other specific components of good faith
are discussed. See id. § 4.01(a) cmt. d (citing Miller v. AT&T, 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974)).
MENDATIONS
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fection. 1' 8 However, courts focusing explicitly on the officer's duty of care might add
new elements to the duty of full information. Clearly, the executive is informed
about all components of the compensation package, the pay of colleagues, the
company's performance, and so on. But did the executive consider the impact of the
compensation, under all the circumstances, on the corporation's public image,
workers, or shareholders? These are questions courts could explicitly bring into the
calculus-questions that all observers but the courts are currently asking. Such
analysis might lead to the conclusion that the officer was not fully informed, thus
removing the protection of the business judgment rule. In addition, the rule's protection could be defeated if the plaintiff can plead a sufficient case of waste of assets,219090
or if the court for some reason does not apply the business judgment rule at all.
C.

The Duty of Loyalty

Modern substantive analysis by courts and commentators of the corporate
officer's fiduciary duty of loyalty focuses almost exclusively on self-dealing, insider
trading, corporate opportunities, and the like.2 0 ' Absent fraud or some other extenuating circumstances, 2 2 the ordinary negotiation by a corporate officer with the
corporation regarding compensation will not involve any of these issues. Executive
compensation, rather, is currently analyzed only from the standpoint of the directors' duty.

2

11

A separate duty of loyalty is imposed on officers of a corporation in the Amer-

198. See supra part ll.B.
199. A sufficient pleading of waste of assets removes the presumption of the business judgment rule
with respect to the director's duty of care. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text. Because the
same rules are to apply in considering the officer's duty of care, see MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT, supra
note 7, § 8.42 official cmt., presumably this exception would apply in analyzing the officer's duty of care
as well.
200. See Gallin v. National City Bank, 273 N.Y.S. 87 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
201. See CLARK, supra note 4, at 141-50; HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 182, at 628-51; PRINCIPLES Or CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 7, §§ 5.04-.07. Other cases concerning the officer's
fiduciary duty typically concern only questions of agency, authority, and respondeat superior. See Sparks
& Hamermesh, supra note 8, at 220 (noting that the corporate officer's duty of loyalty "is a duty owed
under general principles of agency law"). See also HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 182, at 624-25; 2
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. 1068.1-.2 (1992) (collecting cases). Professor Christy, discussing
generally the limitations of the duty of loyalty, noted that "[clourts are willing to recognize only
problems concerning directors' and officers' personal dealings with the corporation, usurpations of corporate opportunities, and appropriations of confidential corporate information. . . . In other contexts,
however, courts have abdicated decisional responsibility." J. Gordon Christy, Corporate Mismanagement
as Malpractice: A Critical Reanalysis of Corporate Managers' Duties of Care and Loyalty, 21 Hous. L.
REV. 105, 174 (1984).
202. For example, Minnesota prohibits any increase in the compensation of officers of public corporations during a tender offer except for increases conferred in the "ordinary course" of business. See
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.255(3) (West Supp. 1992).
203. See supra part III.A. Of course, in most states the duty of loyalty would not be implicated if
the recipient of compensation is not a director. Even in those states where a contract between the corporation and a non-director officer is brought within the self-dealing statute, see supra note 96, the
resulting fairness requirement is imposed on the corporation-the board of directors-and not on the
executive recipient.
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ican Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance."4 Section 5.01 states a
general duty of fair dealing imposed upon "senior executives."2' ' Prior to its appearance in the Principles, such a duty existed, if at all, only implicitly in statutes
providing for avoidance of the common law rule of automatic voidability.2 0 6 No such
separate statement of an officer's fiduciary duty was necessary according to the
drafters of the Model Act, who believed that agency law adequately covered the
subject.2 0 7 In keeping with current statutes, however, the Principles recognize the
more relaxed standard of review given to executive compensation decisions by the
and permit the board's decision to discharge the officer's liability
board of directors
208
as well.
Outside of the Principles,only two hints of a separate fiduciary duty owed by a
corporate officer in accepting compensation otherwise appear in court decisions.
First, courts occasionally opine in dicta of such a duty.20 9 Second, and more telling,
are cases specifically discussing the liability of individuals once a breach of the
otherwise amorphous duty of care is found. Typically, each defendant is both an
officer and a director of the corporation. Occasionally, however, non-officer directors
are held liable for authorizing amounts paid to others, indicating that the duty
involved is owed primarily by the directors.2 1 0 Courts also hint of a duty owed sepa-

204. The duty is styled as "the duty of fair dealing" to refer only to those situations in which the
director or officer has a pecuniary interest as a subset of the traditional "duty of loyalty" referring to
conflicting interests generally. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 7, part V introductory note a.
205. "Directors, senior executives and controlling shareholders, when interested in a matter
affecting the corporation, are under a duty of fair dealing .... " PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 7, § 5.01. "Senior executives" are the officers of the corporation as that term is
ordinarily understood. See id. §§ 1.27, 1.33.
206. See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 96. See also BRODSKY & AOAMSKI, supra note 113, § 3:08 ("Although not all
of the statutes cover transactions with nondirector officers, the same general common law rule imposing
the burden of proving fairness on the interested party should apply to transactions with officers as well as
to transactions with directors.").
208. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 7, § 5.03 & cmt. a. See also
CLARK, supra note 4, at 192-93 (discussing the "relatively loose scrutiny of executive compensation
under corporate law principles"). Both comments, however, focus clearly on the directors' liability, even
though the Principles of Corporate Governance purport to discharge the officer's duty of fair dealing in
this fashion as well. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE supra note 7, at § 5.03(a).
209. See, e.g., Koplar v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 19 F. Supp. 173, 188 (D. Del. 1937) ("As a
matter of morals such payments may be questioned. Directors have the power to award just compensation. That power should be used, not abused. Fair human requirements [on the part of the recipients]
should set some limits to salaries."); Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 625 (Del. 1984) (citing plaintiffs'
allegation that "permitting and accepting the payments were breaches of fiduciary duty" (emphasis
added), but not separately discussing the latter issue); Flight Equip. & Engineering Corp. v. Shelton, 103
So. 2d 615, 623 (Fla. 1958) (stating that "[tihe officers of a corporation occupy a quasi-fiduciary relation
to the stockholders and the corp6ration"); Chelsea Indus., Inc. v. Gaffney, 449 N.E.2d 320, 326 (Mass.
1983); Adelman v. Conotti Corp., 213 S.E.2d 774, 780 (Va. 1975) (quoting from the Chancellor's
opinion letter that "[elven though transactions between [the defendant officers] and the Board might
meet the arms length requirement this does not do away with the stockholders' right to have the actions
measured against duties owing to them").
210. in Carr v. Kimball, 139 N.Y.S. 253, 265 (App. Div. 1912), aff'd mer., 109 N.E. 1068 (N.Y.
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rately by the non-director officers. 1
Thus, it appears that the officer's fiduciary duty of loyalty remains amorphous.
Though it is well-defined in personal self-dealing, insider trading, and corporate
opportunity cases, this duty is often stated but never directly applied in executive
compensation cases. No court has separately considered this duty, and even where
clearly stated, as in the Principles of Corporate Governance, it is dischargeable by
the conduct of others-namely, the board of directors. However, this duty could be
a powerful and analytically useful tool if properly invoked.

D. A Return to Reasonableness
Under either the duty of care or duty of loyalty analysis, courts would likely
turn, as they do in cases involving directors, to a general discussion of reasonableness of the executive's compensation. Under the duty of care analysis,
reasonableness would be the measure of the officer's due care or whether corporate
assets are being wasted.21 2 Under the duty of loyalty analysis, reasonableness would
on the court's inquiry as is currently done when considering
likely be used as a limit
21 3
liability.
directors'
But the reasonableness would be judged as evaluated by the officer as recipient,

1915), the court held that non-officer directors were not liable for excessive salaries. A subsequent decision by the appellate division, however, was reversed on this point by the court of appeals. See Godley v.
Crandall & Godley Co., 139 N.Y.S. 236, 246 (App. Div. 1912), rev'd, 105 N.E. 818, 821 (N.Y. 1914).
The memorandum affirmance in Carr is without opinion and apparently does not recognize the court of
appeals' reversal in Godley. A later court of appeals decision accepts the holding of Carr with no mention
of Godley. See In re Horowitz' Will, 78 N.E.2d 598, 600 (N.Y. 1948).
In Crowley v. Communications for Hosp., Inc., 573 N.E.2d 996 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991), one nonofficer director settled with the plaintiffs, leaving only officer-directors when the case was decided. Id. at
998 n.4. See also HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 182, at 690 & n.2 (citing cases).
Non-officer directors' liabilities may be limited or eliminated by the state statutes limiting directors'
liabilities enacted following Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). These statutes typically
limit a director's liability for breach of the duty of care, but not the duty of loyalty. Unfortunately,
however, this distinction is not clear in many of the statutes, see James J. Hanks, Jr., Evaluating Recent
State Legislation on Director and Officer Liability Limitation and Indemnification, 43 Bus. LAW. 1207,
1212-15 (1988), nor is it clear in the courts' decisions, see, e.g., Hanrahan v. Kruidenier, 473 N.W.2d
184, 188 (Iowa 1991) (holding that "[tihe claim [of director liability for authorizing excessive executive
compensation] is premised solely on, neither a breach of care nor a breach of fiduciary duty, but rather a
hybrid of the two"). The impact of these liability-limiting statutes which specifically apply to officers is
discussed infra part V.B.3.
211. In Teren v. Howard, 322 F.2d 949, 955 (9th Cir. 1943), the court held defendant officerdirectors liable for excessive salaries paid to them as officers, but also indicated that the other directors
would be secondarily liable. This suggests that liability is based on the officer's duty. See also HENN &
ALEXANDER, supra note 182, at 690 & n.4 (citing Flight Equip. & Engineering Corp. v. Shelton, 103 So.
2d 615, 626-27 (Fla. 1958), which did not involve executive compensation on this issue, but rather the
officer's action in preferring a creditor of the corporation over its shareholders).
See also PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 7, § 5.03 cmt. h (stating that "the
court should take steps to avoid any double recovery against the director or senior executive who received
the compensation and the directors who authorized the payment").
212. See supra part llI.B.3.
213. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
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not as evaluated by the directors as grantors. It is this twist on the traditional analysis that makes the separate duty of the officer uniquely valuable in evaluating
executive compensation in public corporations. Courts would thus be empowered to
meet the cases challenging executive compensation with relevant economic and
policy analysis. Would imposition of this fiduciary duty on the part of the executive
officer work to reduce either the levels of compensation in public corporations or at
least the periodic public outrage? Part V examines the shortcomings of the current
legal rules and the potential advantages of analysis of the officer's independent duty.
V.

THE OFFICER'S INDEPENDENT DUTIES AS A SOLUTION

To determine the value of analysis of the officers' duties rather than directors'
duties, this part examines the comparative faults of current legal analysis and evaluates the comparative advantages of application of the officer's separate duties.
A.

The Shortcomings of Current Analysis

It is obvious from the headlines that the current legal system has failed to
respond to the public outrage over executive compensation.2"4 The current rules fail
because they place no responsibility upon the executive for setting that compensation. Even when new doctrines or cases suggest actual liability might run to the
executive,2"' that liability exists only when the directors have failed in their duty. It
is a curious rule of law that evaluates one person's liability according to another's
conduct absent traditional principles of secondary liability.," If indeed there exists
a separate duty on the part of the recipient officer, why should that duty be
discharged by the directors? The current rules offer no answer to this puzzle. The
result is that directors, properly creating an independent committee, can rely on the
information provided by a one-sided market as judged by directors sympathetic to
the recipient officer. If they follow this process, the law absolves all persons involved
from any liability.
One possible solution is to augment the role of the board of directors by
requiring them to take a more active role in the review of the executive's performance and compensation. Many commentators have suggested increasing the amount
and reliability of information available to the directors. "" More fundamental
changes in the directors' decision processes with regard to executive compensation
have also been suggested.2" 8 However, these reforms are intended to be voluntary,21 9
214. See supra part IA.
215. See supra note 21).
216. In Teren v. Howard, 322 F.2d 949, 955 (9th Cir. 1963), discussed supra note 211, the court
suggested a primary-secondary liability relationship, but the recipients of compensation in that case were
all directors of the corporation as well. See id.
217. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
218. See Martin Lipton & Jay W. Lorsch, A Modest Proposalfor Improved Corporate Governance, 48 Bus. LAW, 59, 72-73 (1992) (recommending routine annual performance-based assessments of
the chief executive by each director individually).
219. See id. at 63 (suggesting that any wait for a change in laws or regulations risks further
declines in national competitiveness, and that any such changes, being politically motivated, may do more
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and it is unlikely that reviewing courts invoking the business judgment rule would
be able or willing to impose any such change.
B.

The Comparative Advantages of the Officer's Duty
as a Guide for Judicial Analysis

In contrast to the existing system, the recognition by courts of a separate duty
of the officer recipient would place the ability to control compensation and the effective legal responsibility for doing so in the same person. Suggestions that the board
of directors become more active in reviewing the executive's pay and performance
rely on changes in entrenched behavior, 220 and would require changes in the law as
well to be effective.221 By contrast, courts may take "off the shelf" a long-standing,
though rarely recognized duty, the officer's independent duty, and immediately put
it to work. As discussed below, this would efficiently dampen the economic motivations of officers to overcompensate themselves and reinforces long-accepted notions
of a positive fiduciary duty, yet will not likely lead to extraordinary liability on the
part of these officers.
1.

Placing the Duty to Control with the Ability to Control

Executive compensation in public corporations has grown out of control because
the duty to control it has been placed by the law largely in the hands of those who
have no ability to do so: the board of directors. Imposing the primary duty on the
officer instead avoids this problem.
The economic analysis presented above posits three reasons why excessive executive compensation exists.222 A legal rule that relies on the corporate officer's duties
effectively counteracts each of these economic motivations. First, nonowner
managers have economic incentives to consume excess perquisites, or "shirk."
Recognizing the officer's duty to consider in good faith the best interests of the
corporation gives the officer a significant incentive to avoid shirking, an incentive
absent from current law with its focus on the directors' conduct. Second, executives
have at their disposal an imperfect market in which they bargain with underinformed and sympathetic purchasers. Under existing analysis, that market is not
manipulated by the directors whose conduct is at issue, and thus courts are
constrained to accept its results. But no such reliance may be had by the executive
who selects compensation experts or by last year's salary alone compounds the
excesses of this year's salary; the market is no defense. Finally, economic analysis
recognizes the separation of pay from performance as a cause of excessive executive
compensation. Focusing on the officer's duties, particularly the fiduciary duty,
imposes on the officer the obligation to return to the trust what should not have been

harm than good).
220. -'lT]he norms of behavior in most boardrooms are dysfunctional. They discourage directors
from speaking out, especially if they are going to be critical of management, and they inhibit independent
directors from asserting leadership among their peers." Lipton & Lorsch, supra note 218, at 66.
221. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
222. See supra part II.
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received, regardless of the genuine intent of the payers.
Consider the hypothetical case of a chief executive of a large public company
with a compensation package of several hundred thousand dollars of base pay, a
bonus measured by the corporation's net income, and some traditional stock options.
The base pay would likely be determined based on a survey of certain other chief
executives in carefully-selected companies."' The bonus is paid because the
company's net income rose over last year's, though it lagged significantly behind
competitors and a profit was made only by significant liquidations and layoffs. The
stock options are a bargain because the company's poor performance has depressed
the stock price, so the chief executive will derive a future benefit from past poor
performance.
Under current law, the compensation package will survive a challenge by a
disgruntled shareholder, provided it is arrived at by a compensation committee
composed of independent directors who commissioned a survey and undertook some
deliberations. Once these requirements are met, the business judgment rule
presumption protects the merits of the committee's decision from further inquiry.
Consider in contrast the officer's separate duties of due care and loyalty. No
business judgment rule presumption would exist to protect the officer's analysis from
judicial review. 22' Challengers will thus be able to examine the officer's conduct
directly. Are the compensation packages of peers selected by or for the compensation committee representative? Is there or has there been any effective competition
for the chief executive's position-has that person ever been involuntarily replaced?
Did the executive consider the impact on employee morale and productivity of lavish
compensation in the midst of layoffs? Can the executive conclude rationally and in
good faith that it is in the best interests of the corporation to reward relatively poor
performance so richly? Was the risk and work effort really 100 times greater than
that of the factory worker, or was it partially the result of longevity in the executive
suite? In accepting stock options, can it be concluded in good faith that the future
price of the corporation's stock accurately measures the value of the services
rendered? These are the questions the executive will be asked. And instead of
relying on perfunctory examination of her contract by the board of directors, the
defendant executive will be put to the task of proof and persuasion that there was no
"shirking" or "consumption of excessive perquisites" involved, that the negotiation
process was fair and there was no overreaching, and that the amount of compensation is reasonable in light of all relevant factors surrounding the position, the
company, and even the overall economy.
The court would thus, for the first time, be required to include these relevant
factors in its analysis. Opinions would evaluate the robustness of the market for

223.

Crystal suggests that these "surveys" are in many cases unabashedly result-oriented. See

CRYISTAL, supra note 27, at 44-45.

224. If the challenge is based solely on the officer's duty of care, the business judgment rule
presumption might arise unless courts add new elements to the duty to be fully informed, which is one of
the rule's prerequisites. See supra notes 191-200 and accompanying text. If the challenge is based on the
officer's fiduciary duty of loyalty, however, the business judgment rule should not apply. See supra text
accompanying note 97.
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executive compensation upon which the directors otherwise rely. While the directors
can throw up their hands and honestly state that, although the market is imperfect
and overpriced, they have no option but to offer the market price,2" the officer as
recipient, the person who sets the price in the imperfect market, would have no such
defense. Courts would instead consider other existing explanatory factors, such as
the organizational hierarchy and the need for pay increases at each level, the extent
to which the compensation arrangement assures that the corporation's superior
performance is actually a result of the executive's efforts, and perhaps even the
executive's actual work effort as well. Courts would also be able to explicitly incorporate in their analyses factors contributing to the current popular criticism of
executive compensation, such as the effects on employee and stockholder morale. In
the investigation of those issues and the resulting explicit judicial analysis of them,
the relevant questions will at last be asked and answered.
2.

Rediscovering Positive Duties

In addition to the greater efficiency of placing duty and responsibility in the
same person, reliance on the officer's independent duty is advantageous because it
makes explicit this long-implicit but often-ignored rule. Officers have a duty, and it
should be recognized. They should decline unreasonable compensation because it is
the right thing to do.
In many situations, corporate law has recognized the ability of a well-functioning market to balance economic motivations for the maximum benefit to all
participants instead of imposing positive rules directly. When markets are operating
efficiently, they respond to all concerns more flexibly and efficiently than external
rules. 2 ' Executive compensation is now viewed as an area to be governed by market
forces; the role of the law to date has been to ensure that this market functions as
efficiently as possible. Current reform efforts merely continue this pattern, assuring
accurate measurement and disclosure of compensation costs, 2 2 7 improving disclosure
to shareholders,22 and increasing the amount and reliability of the compensation
information given to the board of directors. 229 But when it is clear, as with executive
compensation in public corporations, that the market has significant failings, the law
should return to imposition of positive duties.23 0 Indeed, the original imposition on
225. See supra notes 64-71 and accompanying text.
226. See, e.g., Fama & Jensen, supra note 54; Fama, supra note 53; Jensen & Meckling, supra
note 54; authorities cited supra note 60.
227. See S. 1198, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1991), discussed supra note 20 and accompanying
text.
228. See id. See also the recent proposals of the SEC to bolster disclosure in this area, discussed
supra note 22 and accompanying text.
229. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing retention of an independent consultant
to the board of directors' compensation committee).
230. Professor Hazen argues for the retention of fiduciary principles in corporation law, noting that
economic analyses fail to take into account "'economic man's' rational self-interest when embodied in
corporate managers' bargaining with their shareholders;" nor do they "take into account fairness considerations." Hazen, supra note 182, at 298.
Professor Brudney, noting the market failures in this area, observes:
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corporate directors and managers of duties of care and loyalty was in response to
the need to provide protection for investors and creditors outside the market's
operation.2 3s
It is universally recognized that the rule at which courts chip away with exceptions is clear and unwavering: the corporate executive holds power in trust for the
benefit of others. 32 At the same time, it is equally recognized that a limit on judicial review of the executive's exercise of that power is necessary to allow the
executive to function at all. This is the genesis of the business judgment rule 233 and
other less pervasive limits on otherwise strict trustee-like duties.2 3 4
It is of course impossible to state categorically when relaxation of the strict
rules is appropriate. This is the inherent tension in the grant of power to corporate
managers and the responsibility which that grant necessarily imposes.
The question is not academic. Its solution .. .would give greater flexibility to corporate managements in certain respects. . . .But where no
showing of benefit can be made, and where one group within the corporation is to be sacrificed for the benefit of another, it would, equally,
[Mietaphorical allusions to contract or to the principal-agent relationship are inapposite if
the task is to enable the investor to limit management's capacity to reward itself. . . . In
the case of management of large public corporations, the fiduciary restrictions are . . .
neither prophylactic, nor indeed very rigorous, so the need for stockholder consent . . . to
avoid their prohibition is not so great. Nevertheless, the nexus-of-contracts view [reliance
on the market to create necessary contractual limits] invokes such informed consent to
justify even broader managerial discretion to reward itself. But the difficulty is that such
consent is neither appropriately informed nor volitional.
Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
1403, 1436-37 (1985). Accord Hazen, supra note 182, at 299-301.
Professor Vagts makes similar observations directed specifically at executive compensation.
While predominant public opinion will accept great inequalities if justified by the market
and market-related concepts of what is earned and deserved, it is difficult to legitimize any
amounts larger than that. [Tlhe considerations of corporate legitimacy, integrity, and
morale involved are important. They indicate that, even if in the overall economic scheme
of things, the amounts of money involved are not of vast importance, the problem is worth
expending effort on in order to keep it under control. These problems fall between the
meshes of the relevant markets and must be consciously addressed by the responsible
institutions.
Vagts, supra note 10, at 274.
231. One writer notes that it was generally recognized as early as the 1920s that we could no
longer rely on the market to be the "pervasive, impersonal policeman it had once been, or had once
seemed to be." JAMES W. HURST. THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES 1780-1970, at 110 (1970).
232. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 10, at 247-49; DAVID C. BAYNE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF
CORPORATE CONTROL: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF FIDUCIARY DUTY 23-34 (1986); Beveridge, supra
note 96, at 671; Hazen, supra note 182, at 278-79.
233. "In a sense, the business judgment rule is just a corollary of the usual statutory provision that
it is the directors who shall manage the corporation." CLARK, supra note 4, at 123. See also Vagts, supra
note 10, at 274 (commenting that "intervention into corporate activity ordinarily is at some cost to the
efficiency of the business operation").
234. See Brudney, supra note 230, at 1407-10 & nn.14-19.
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circumscribe the use of certain apparently absolute powers.2

a
5

And the general problem of allocating responsibility and authority exists unmitigated in the specific area of executive compensation. It is difficult to reconcile rules
imposing duties of care and loyalty with rules giving managers the discretion to run
the firm.
This antithesis burdens the law with a paradoxical challenge: To establish standard and acceptable processes for adequately compensating the
[manager] for his vast abilities, and to outlaw both the individual's
personal appropriation of official, corporate assets, and the officeholder's
personal retention of unjust compensation either during or after the
tenure of office. 2 6
Thus, the purpose of a return to imposition of duties of care and loyalty is not to
universally renounce reliance on market-based or contract approaches, but rather to
recognize their limits. When the market is imperfect or the contracting process onesided, as it clearly is with executive compensation, positive rules must be used to
supply the motivation to act in accordance with social norms since the market has
failed to do so.'37
Courts have accepted this notion without serious question. It appears infrequently in cases only because of current law's focus on the duties of the directors in
setting executive compensation. When courts turn as an aside to the recipient, the
officer's duty is astonishingly clear to them. 238 From the earliest cases declaring, but
declining to exercise the power to limit executive compensation, courts have indicated the duty lies initially with the recipient. "The duty of the . ..executives
participating in the bonus seems plain-they should be the first to consider unselfishly whether under all the circumstances their bonus allotments are fair and
'
reasonable.' ssB
Thus, it is clear that corporation law recognizes the primacy of rules of law,
relying on marketplace substitutes when efficient. Executive compensation is an area
that should be reclaimed from market-based deferential rules. A return to the positive legal rule is hardly novel, but rather revives a doctrine universally recognized

235.
236.
237.

supra note 10, at 248-49.
supra note 232, at 151-52.
Professor Hazen, comparing freedom-of-contract and fiduciary duty analyses, concludes:
BERLE & MEANS,
BAYNE,

The fiduciary paradigm is a necessary limitation on the right to contract within the corporate setting. This limitation . . . is warranted because of the recognition of the relative
unequal power positions of the various corporate constituencies. The fiduciary principle also
is applicable because a corporation is not only an economic institution but is also a
powerful political and social institution ....
Finally, corporate managers . . . are in fact
managing other people's money.
Hazen, supra note 182, at 318.
238. See supra note 211 (discussing cases addressing officers' liability for excessive compensation).
239. Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653, 680 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (quoting Winkelman v. General
Motors Corp., 39 F. Supp. 826, 834 (S.D.N.Y. 1940)), afl'd mem., 32 N.Y.S.2d 131 (App. Div. 1941).
See also supra note 209 (citing cases providing statements in dicta of the officer's separate duty).
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even in its dormancy.

3.

The Scope of Executive Officer Liability

It would surely be an initial concern of public corporations and executives that
such a rule would create extensive and indeterminate liability on the part of the
recipient. One need only recall the virtually instantaneous response of the bar,
commentators, and state legislators to the imposition of similar liability upon directors in Smith v. Van Gorkom.2 4 ' However, such concerns will likely be overstated.
As discussed below, any liability imposed pursuant to this analysis will run only to
the individuals at the peak of the corporation's authority structure, and will be
circumscribed by clear legal principles.
The source of the current controversy is the overpayment of the chief executives and a handful of subordinate officers in the largest thousand or so corporations
doing business in the United States.142 Thus, although, the problem is significant
independent of its monetary impact,24 it can be redressed by imposing duties and
corresponding liability on a universe of a few thousand potential defendants.
Only executives shouldering these duties of care and loyalty would be subject to
liability. The duty of care is imposed only upon "[ain officer with discretionary
authority; '244 thus, the duty is only as broad as the discretion vested in that officer.
Furthermore, the term "officer" refers only to those persons designated by the directors in those capacities.2 ' " And the duty of loyalty owed apart from the ordinary
duty of agent to principal is similarly imposed only upon the top executives. 46
240. Recognizing and returning to the standard of a positive fiduciary duty would be an improvement over current law's deference to the process followed by the board of directors, but it is of course no
guarantee. In cases involving close corporations, courts have routinely focused on fiduciary duties. See
supra notes 149-56 and accompanying text. The vigor of those duties has been found by some to be
waning. See Mitchell, supra note 155.
488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). One commentator noted: "The corporate bar generally views the
'241.
decision as atrocious. Commentators predict dire consequences as directors come to realize how exposed
they have become." Bayless Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom after
Van Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAW. 1, I (1985). See also Hanks, supra note 210, at 1208-09 (discussing the
response of liability insurance carriers and ultimately of state legislatures, and analyzing resulting
legislation).
242. See supra notes 35-36.
243. See supra notes 39-52 and accompanying text.
244. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT, supra note 7, § 8.42(a).
245. See id.§ 8.40(a).
246. See Sparks & Hamermesh, supra note 8, at 216 (noting that "[nor purposes of determining
whether fiduciary duties attach, the scope of the term 'officer' seems to be a function of responsibilities").
See also PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 7, part V cmt. a. This document titles
these persons "senior executives," referring only to the top three or four individuals in the hierarchical
authority of the corporation and its "principal business unit[s]." Id. §§ 1.27, 1.33.
For example, in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969), the court considered whether certain officers of Texas Gulf Sulphur were obligated to
inform the board of directors of material business developments before accepting stock options. The trial
court's holding, not appealed on this point, was that two TGS employees, "not being then members of top
management (although [one] was a vice president) had no duty to disclose their knowledge . . .before
accepting their options," id. at 857, and that they "could reasonably assume that their superiors, ...
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In addition to these limitations on the scope of the duties of care and loyalty,
challenges to executive compensation will likely be limited to those at the top
because those are the individuals with disproportionately larger pay. The executives
ranking below the top of the corporation's authority structure are not likely to be
recipients of compensation that would be considered so excessive to be challenged by
potential plaintiffs.247
Liability will not be indeterminate if measured by the officer's duties of care
and loyalty. Courts possess the analytical tools to make reasonableness evaluations.
They do so in evaluating executive compensation under other laws,248 and countless
other applications of reasonableness exist in the law. Courts will make principled
decisions because they have the ability to do so, and await only proof by advocates
of the proper standard by which to measure the conduct at issue.2 49 In addition, the
threat of litigation may serve to correct imperfections in the market for executive
compensation. If lower salaries are agreed to, and plaintiffs are ultimately unsuccessful, a needed measure of certainty would be restored. Executives with the
guidance of counsel can apply the legal doctrines to avoid litigation as well as to
survive it.
Nor will the liability of officers be debilitating. Most observers agree that most
executives of large public corporations possess managerial and entrepreneurial skills
commensurate with their positions. Even staunch reformers concede that top execuwho were directors of the corporation, would report the [information to the board] if that was advisable."
Id. at 856. Although the duty involved in this case was one imposed under Securities Exchange Act Rule
lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1992), the duty and its discharge by reliance on superiors is similar to the
fiduciary duty involved in conflicting-interest transactions.
247. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
248. See supra part III.C. See also Barris, supra note 23, at 87 ("Since courts have been able to
grapple with this problem in other contexts, [tax, close corporation and partnership cases], there seems to
be no real justification to balk at applying the same analysis to public companies. In either large or small
operations, clear abuses should be recognizable.").
249. Professor Christy argues that courts should apply generally recognized tort and contract principles to allegations of managerial misconduct, as they do in countless other substantive areas of the law.
The analytical tools that courts lack, he suggests, can be supplied by advocates educating the bourt on
current recognized business standards, as the advocates do with professional standards in many other
areas of the law. See Christy, supra note 201, at 174-76. To do less, he chides, "is as if in medical
malpractice cases courts dismissed all claims except those in which the surgeon .amputated the wrong
limb." Id. at 168-69. Barris, writing in 1992, concurs with Christy's 1984 assessment.
Not only isthe court capable of determining "how much is too much," but there is no
rational reason why a court cannot examine a compensation package [to evaluate incentive
payment plans]. . . .The court should go beyond a mere inquiry into whether the corporation has followed the proper procedure and get to the ultimate question of the
appropriateness of huge compensation packages. Plenty of tools are available to assist in
the undertaking, including independent analysts and masses of comparative compensation
data.
Barris, supra note 23, at 87-88.
Statistical analysis of Tax Court cases involving executive compensation revealed consistent use by
courts of several commonly-accepted factors in determining the reasonableness of compensation. The
researcher advocated more dedicated use of statistical models, exhorting that "[c]ourt implications from
this study are that rational means exist to aid factual determinations .... " Boyd, supra note 162, at 99.
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tives are entitled to a hefty premium over the average wage for their services. 50 To
the extent application of duties of care and loyalty results in trimming of executive
compensation, defendants would have little to complain about, for they are merely
being held to their legal duties. This is a standard comparable to that of other
professionals 51 and long-stated in the law as a positive duty owed by them as quasitrustees. 5 2
Would such liability reduce the quality of management of public corporations
or otherwise impinge on top executives unfairly or unreasonably? No experts have
shown a link between current so-called "incentive" pay plans and superior executive
performance;253 it is thus equally unproven that reduction of otherwise unreasonable
compensation 'in a fair and reasoned fashion would reduce efforts or performance.
And, even the most extreme reductions of executive pay, perhaps from seven figures
to six, are unlikely to be considered confiscatory or unfair.254
Finally, in at least five states, those same post-Van Gorkom statutes limiting
directors' liability operate in the officers' favor as well.2 55 Thus, to the extent an
officer's liability for receiving unreasonable compensation is held by courts to sound
as a violation of the officer's duty of care rather than duty of loyalty,256 liability will
be limited. Even if this list of states is expanded, such limitation of individual
liability will not eviscerate the officer's duty of care. It binds only shareholder 2plain57
tiffs, who could, of course, still seek to enjoin future excessive compensation.
Thus, although liability of any officer for excessive compensation will likely be
limited, it will nonetheless be significant to that particular officer and, more importantly, to the corporation's workers and shareholders. The message sent by holding
officers to their preexisting duties of care and loyalty is that the chief executives will
be required to consider their own compensation with the same diligence as their
other business decisions. This change will have an impact on the corporation's
250. See, e.g., Runaway Executive Pay, supra note 2, at 5 (suggesting a top salary of 20-30 times
average wages) (testimony of Professor Crystal).
251. See id.
252. See id.; BAYNE, supra note 232; BERLE & MEANS, supra note 10.
253. See supra notes 37-74 and accompanying text.
254. One symptom of the problem which has stirred public outrage can be found in statements like
that of International Multifoods" Anthony Luiso, who, in agreeing to reduce his salary approximately ten
percent to just under $700,000 in exchange for stock options, noted that it "would be painful ... but
also something that I could afford to give up and still put food on the table." Bennett, supra note 24, at
A4.
255. See Hanks, supra note 210, at 1241; BLOCK ET AL., supra note 90, at 42-43 (listing 5 states:
Louisiana. Maryland, Nevada, New Jersey, and Virginia). See generally MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT,
. upra note 7, § 2.02(b)(4) & official cmt. 3(i).
256. These statutes and executive compensation cases have drawn rather unclear lines in this area.
See supra note 210.
257. In addressing similar concerns with respect to directors' conduct, Hanks notes:
They are unlikely to view these provisions as a green light for inattention, self-dealing, or
other mischief. . . . They know they can still be sued by third parties or for equitable
relief, and most directors, like most human beings, do not enjoy litigation even when their
own assets are not at risk.
Hanks, supra note 210, at 1244.
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constituencies beyond its monetary impact on officers individually or collectively.258
CONCLUSION'

The refrain of outrage at compensation paid to the top executives in public
corporations is at the heights of its now predictable reprise. The public perception of
unfairness is undeniable. The law can and should repair this unfairness. By putting
to work well-established but dormant principles, the law can place the duty to
consider the best interests of the corporation firmly on the shoulders of those who
can do it most efficiently: the recipients of executive compensation. By doing so, we
can restore the confidence of all participants and policymakers in the process as well
as the outcome, and perhaps make this reprise the last.

258.

See supra text accompanying notes 242-43.

